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This paper characterizes generic equilibrium play in a multi-sender version of Craw-
ford and Sobels (1982) cheap talk model, when robustness to a broad class of beliefs
about noise in the sendersobservation of the state is required. Just like in the one-
sender model, information transmission is partial, equilibria have an interval form, and
they can be computed through a generalized version of Crawford and Sobels forward
solution procedure. Fixing the sendersbiases, full revelation is not achievable even as
the state space becomes large. Intuitive welfare predictions, such as the desirability of
consulting senders with small and opposite biases, follow.
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1 Introduction
The transmission of information is an integral part of many economic models, whether
implicitly or explicitly. In certain settings, such transmission is strategic: the side sending the
information may choose the message in order to maximize its payo¤. At the same time, the
party receiving the information may be unable to o¤er incentives that signicantly improve
the informativeness of the message.
The seminal work of Crawford and Sobel (1982, henceforth CS) examines such a setting.
A sender observes the state of the world  2 [0; 1], sends a message to the receiver, who
then takes an action. Both the sender and the receiver desire a higher action when  is
higher, but the optimal action for the sender di¤ers from the optimal action for the receiver.
Talk is cheap in the sense that neither players utility depends on the senders message. CS
show that equilibria in this setting feature the sender revealing an interval of the state space.
Moreover, there is a nite upper bound on the number of intervals that can be distinguished
in equilibrium, and this bound increases as the senders bias relative to the receiver becomes
small.
This paper examines a model very similar to CSs, but with multiple senders simultane-
ously sending their messages. For example, a policymaker may seek the opinion of multiple
experts. In multi-sender cheap talk games, because the actions that a given sender can
induce depend on what messages other senders use, there exists a large set of equilibria,
and there has so far been little progress in characterizing or rening it. Most existing work,
reviewed later in the introduction, focuses on fully revealing equilibria, whose reasonability
is questioned.
The main results of this paper show that, for an open and dense set of preferences and
prior ("generically"), "robust" equilibria in this model have an interval structure, in that each
message vector reveals an interval of states, just like equilibria in the one-sender CS model.
Moreover, at each boundary between two intervals, only one senders message changes,1 so
that senders do not coordinate locally about whether they are in the interval to the left or the
one to the right of the boundary. The sender whose message changes must be indi¤erent at
the boundary between inducing the action corresponding to the left interval and the action
corresponding to the right interval, just like in CS equilibria. The latter property implies
that the set of these coordination-free equilibria is nite and tractable: each such equilibrium
can be computed through a generalized version of the CS forward solution procedure. This
paper is the rst that selects and characterizes a set of equilibria in simultaneous multi-sender
cheap talk.
1I.e. there is no state  such that two or more senders use a di¤erent message on each side of .
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The proposed robustness concept requires equilibria to survive the possibility of small
noise - where sendersobservations are very close to  (with high probability) - in the senders
observations of : an equilibrium is (strongly) robust if every players strategy remains nearly
optimal. Optimality is in an interim sense: each senders message must be nearly optimal
given her observed signal, and the receivers action must be nearly optimal given the senders
messages. This papers results hold whether senders are required to have common prior
about the noise, or merely to have common knowledge that noise is small, which allows for
the possibility of heterogeneous priors about the exact form of the noise.2
Many papers have studied the use of perturbations to the information structure to select
equilibria. Most papers in the literature impose few restrictions on these perturbations. As a
result, if heterogeneous prior is allowed, robust equilibria often fail to exist.3 However, when
considering cheap talk specically, it is natural to restrict, for example, the set of payo¤
types: since senders care only about the state and the receivers action, a messages payo¤
implication is entirely dependent on the receivers strategy. This paper chooses to perturb
information only about the parameter that already fails to be commonly known: the state
.4
Theorems 1 and 2 are the main results of this paper. Theorem 2 shows that coordination-
free equilibria (in which no sender ever nds a deviation leading to an out-of-equilibrium
message vector to be nearly optimal) are robust, while, generically, pure-strategy equilibria
that do not lead to the same play as a coordination-free equilibrium at almost all states
fail robustness. The key to this result is that in coordination-free proles, for any sender i
and at any state , the message prescribed for i is nearly optimal whenever other senders
send messages prescribed at a state near . Sender i therefore has little incentive to modify
her course of action as a result of small noise. By contrast, in other equilibria, a sender is
message at a state can be substantially suboptimal in response to other sendersmessages
at nearby states, and with noise, i may believe that the latter messages are likely to be
2Online Appendix C shows that if the robustness concept were relaxed to require only that some "nearby"
strategy prole be nearly optimal, then the results would still hold if heterogeneous priors about noise are
allowed.
3For example, Oyama and Tercieux (2010) show, in nite complete information games, that generically,
an equilibrium is robust only if it is the unique rationalizable action prole. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show
a similar result when, instead, interim beliefs are concentrated around the complete information payo¤s. (In
fact, Weinstein and Yildiz show that, with the interim approach, imposing common prior would not change
their result.)
4Even only perturbing information about , it can still be common 0-belief that payo¤s are near the
payo¤s of the complete information game, just like in global games (see, for example, Carlsson and van
Damme (1993)).
This paper also di¤ers from most of the literature by requiring only approximate optimality. Haimanko
and Kajii (2015) do so as well in order to guarantee existence of robust equilibria in the Kajii and Morris
(1997) framework.
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sent. The class of small noise examined in Theorem 2 has senders observing a signal near
the true state with certainty. Theorem 1 shows that strong robustness, which allows for a
small probability of the signal being far from the state, generically selects coordination-free
equilibria where every combination of on-path messages form an on-path message vector.5
Several studies have examined simultaneous multi-sender cheap talk. Krishna and Mor-
gan (2001a) note that if the sendersbiases are su¢ ciently small relative to the state space,
full revelation is achievable: for example, the receiver may threaten an action unappealing
to all parties if the sendersmessages diverge.6 Battaglini (2002) notes that fully reveal-
ing equilibria in one-dimensional state spaces rely on implausible out-of-equilibrium beliefs:
in the aforementioned example, were the receiver to face slightly divergent messages due
to noise in the senders observations, it would not be a best response to pick a crazy
action if the senders are telling the truth or nearly doing so.7 Ambrus and Lu (2014) ex-
hibit equilibria that approach full revelation as the state space becomes large, do not rely
on out-of-equilibrium beliefs, and, as a result, remain optimal for all players with certain
classes of noise in the sendersobservations. Rubanov (2015) obtains similar results with a
xed state space, as the number of senders becomes large. This paper requires, like Ambrus
and Lu (2014) and Rubanov (2015), (approximate) optimality in the perturbed games, but
considers a broader class of perturbations.8 As a result, more equilibria, including the ones
proposed in those two papers, are ruled out. In particular, as long as the biases of the senders
are bounded away from zero, communication robust to the perturbations considered in this
paper is bounded away from full revelation, even as the size of the state space and/or the
number of senders become large.
In terms of the best coordination-free equilibrium for the receiver, in the popular uniform-
5A previous version of this paper showed that coordination-free equilibria also have a desirable property
in a setting without noise. Consider the induced normal-form game played by senders, given a state and
a receiver strategy. In a coordination-free equilibrium (of the cheap talk game), at almost all states, the
Nash equilibrium (of the induced game) is unique among on-path message vectors. Therefore, coordination-
free equilibria are robust to collusion among senders (in the sense that senders cannot jointly deviate to a
di¤erent Nash equilibrium of the induced game) if o¤-path message vectors are ruled out - for example, the
receiver might be able to harshly punish senders if an o¤-path message vector is observed. At the same time,
equilibria that are not coordination-free generically do not have this property. For example, if all senders
have positive bias, then full revelation is not robust in this sense: the senders could all switch to reporting
 + ".
6Thus, when the sendersbiases are below a certain threshold determined by the size of the state space,
there is no nontrivial bound on the amount of transmission transmitted, and the direction and magnitude
of sender biases do not impact the receivers maximum welfare.
7Ambrus and Takahashi (2008) propose a mild renement that also rules out full revelation in multi-
dimensional state spaces, subject to a technical condition on the shape of the state space.
8If noise were limited to "replacement noise" (where senders observe the exact state with high probability),
then even with heterogeneous beliefs, the equilibria proposed in Section 3 of Ambrus and Lu (2014), presented
in this paper as Example 2, and in Rubanov (2015) would survive.
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quadratic specication:
- having multiple senders instead of one fails to improve the receivers welfare if the
additional sendersbiases are no smaller and in the same direction as the rst senders; and
- if there are senders with a rightward bias and senders with a leftward bias, then as the
state space becomes large, the pair of senders maximizing the receivers welfare consists of
the sender with the smallest rightward bias and the one with the smallest leftward bias.
Similar conclusions hold as long as the prior is near uniform and the players utility
functions are not too asymmetric about their peak. Krishna and Morgan (2001b) study
sequential cheap talk with two senders, and also nd that having senders with opposing
biases is preferable for the receiver. This paper additionally shows, by allowing for more than
two senders, that in coordination-free equilibria, consulting senders beyond the optimal pair
typically yields only modest welfare gains for the receiver. Moreover, the characterization of
coordination-free equilibria provides a way to nd the optimal one for the receiver.
Many other issues related to CS have been investigated: multidimensional state space,9
cheap talk that is sequential or occurs through an intermediary,10 renements in the one-
sender case,11 etc. This paper may contribute to the study of delegation: is it better for the
receiver to retain the decision right and play a cheap talk game, or to delegate the action
to the sender(s)? Melumad and Shibano (1991), Dessein (2002) and Alonso and Matoushek
(2008) study this question in a single-sender setting. Since fully revealing equilibria exist
when there are multiple senders (and when the state space is large relative to the biases),
there has been little scope for studying this question in a multi-sender setting.12 However, if
one expects a coordination-free equilibrium to arise from multi-sender cheap talk, then the
delegation issue becomes nontrivial since coordination-free equilibria cannot approach full
revelation.
9Battaglini (2002, 2004) constructs a fully revealing equilibrium that satises a weak robustness condition
when the state space is unbounded. Ambrus and Takahashi (2008) and Meyer, Moreno de Barreda and
Nafziger (2016) study full revelation with bounded state spaces. See Lai, Lim and Wang (2015) and Vespa
and Wilson (2016) for experimental evidence.
Multidimensional states are mostly outside the scope of this paper because, without strong functional form
assumptions, it is di¢ cult to construct equilibria (other than babbling and fully revealing) with a bounded
state space due to boundary conditions. Section 7.2 explains that requiring only approximate optimality in
the perturbed game is likely to wield limited power when the state space is multi-dimensional.
10Miura (2014) extends Krishna and Morgans (2001b) two-sender analysis of sequential cheap talk to a
two-dimensional state space. Ivanov (2010) and Ambrus, Azevedo and Kamada (2013) consider cheap talk
with intermediaries.
11See, for example, Matthews, Okuno-Funiwara and Postlewaite (1991) and Chen, Kartik and Sobel (2008).
The latter work selects the most informative equilibrium in the CS model, but Miura and Yamashita (2014)
suggest that this may be problematic if theres a possibility that the model is slightly misspecied.
12Another obstacle in studying delegation with multiple experts is that there are many ways to delegate
authority in such a setting. For example, there are many possible sets of rules by which a committee of
experts may come to a decision.
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2 Model
There are n + 1 players: a set N of senders 1; :::; n and a receiver R. The senders observe
a common state of the world  2  = [0; 1], which is drawn from a probability distribution
F (:) with a continuous density f(:) for which there exist d > 0 and D < 1 such that
f() 2 [d;D] for all . Each senders pure strategy mi :  ! Mi assigns a message from
a set Mi to each state. Mi is assumed to be large relative to , so that full revelation is
possible. Upon observing message vector m = (m1; :::;mn), the receiver takes action a(m).
Her pure strategies thus take the form a : ni=1Mi ! .13 When referring to a specic
strategy prole  , denote the receivers action given m by a (m).
All playersutilities depend on the state  and the action a 2  taken by the receiver,
but not (directly) on the message vector m 2 ni=1Mi. Let ui(a; ) denote player is utility
when the action is a and state is , for i = 1; :::; n; R. The following standard assumptions
are maintained throughout the paper:
1. all utility functions are Lipschitz continuous;
2. given , uR(:; ) is strictly concave with a maximum at a = ;
3. given , ui(:; ) is single-peaked, i.e. is strictly increasing to the left, and strictly
decreasing to the right of its unique maximum, denoted  + bi();
4. 9 > 0 such that, for all i 2 N and  2 , either jbi()j >  or  + bi() 2 f0; 1g; and
5. for all i 2 N , if a < a0,  < 0 and ui(a0; )  ui(a; ), then ui(a0; 0) > ui(a; 0).
Assumption 2 implies that the receivers best response is always unique. Assumption 4
and continuity imply that each i is either right-biased (for every , bi() >  or +bi() = 1)
or left-biased (for every , bi() <   or  + bi() = 0). Assumption 5 is the commonly
encountered single-crossing condition.
Messages mi and m0i are said to be equivalent in strategy prole   if a
 (mi;m i) =
a (m0i;m i) whenever the vectorm i is composed of messages that are each sent with positive
probability at some  in  .14 Throughout this paper, when a given strategy prole   is
13Identifying the action space with  allows for an easy statement of the assumption on the receivers
preferences (Assumption 2 below).
14This condition must hold even if m i itself is never sent in  . For example, suppose a (1; 1; 1) =
a (1; 1; 2) = a (1; 2; 1) = a (2; 1; 1) = a, while a (2; 2; 2) = a (2; 2; 1) = a (2; 1; 2) = a (1; 2; 2) = a0 6= a.
Also assume that of these eight message vectors, only (1; 1; 1) and (2; 2; 2) are sent in equilibrium. Then
even though, on path, no senders message a¤ects the action, 1 and 2 are not equivalent for any sender: for
example, if sender 1 sends 1 and sender 2 sends 2, then the actions induced by sender 3 through sending 1
and sending 2 are not the same.
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discussed, mi = ( 6=)m0i means that mi and m0i are (not) equivalent in  , and m = ( 6=)m0
means that each (some) component of m is (not) equivalent in   to the corresponding
component of m0. That is, equivalent messages are treated as if they were the same message.
As is standard for simultaneous multi-sender cheap talk in a continuous type space, this
paper focuses on pure-strategy equilibria in the sense that if a sender mixes between mi and
m0i, then mi and m
0
i must be equivalent.
15
Even when mi and m0i are not equivalent, we may have a
 (mi;m i) = a (m0i;m i) for
some m i sent with positive probability in  . The following assumption rules this out when
(mi;m i) and (m0i;m i) are both sent on path:
Assumption A: If two message vectors m and m0 both occur on path and induce the
same action, then m and m0 cannot di¤er in exactly one component.
Assumption A implies that in a set of states where m i and the induced action are
constant, mi must also be constant, which allows for a simpler description of equilibria. If
the set of states where message vector m is sent in a pure-strategy equilibrium  , henceforth
denoted  (m), is an interval (possibly degenerate) for all on-path m, then   must satisfy
Assumption A: the receivers optimality implies a (m) 2  (m) for all on-path m, so that no
two on-path m can induce the same action. Thus, all CS equilibria, all pure-strategy fully
revealing equilibria and all equilibria proposed in the simultaneous unidimensional cheap
talk literature cited in the introduction satisfy Assumption A. Online Appendix B analyzes
the model without Assumption A.16
When referring to a specic pure-strategy prole  , it is convenient to denote sender is
message at  by m i (), and to let M
 
i = fmi : m i () = mi for some  2 g. Also let




n()) be the message vector sent at state .
The equilibrium concept is weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium (henceforth equilibrium).
Pure strategy prole   = (m1; :::;mn; a) and belief rule  form an equilibrium if:
 for all i 2 N and all  2 , mi() 2 arg maxm0i2Mi ui(a(m0i;m i()); ),




15In the one-sender case, this is without loss of generality (except at the points where the senders message
changes) because any two messages leading to the same action are equivalent.
16The pure-strategy assumption and Assumption A can be summarized as follows: restrict attention to
strategy proles   consistent with each sender i having the following lexicographic preferences. Among
messages yielding the highest expected utility, i picks her preferred one under some strict preference ranking
i; . For example, given the choice between two messages leading to the same outcome, the sender may
pick the simpler one. (i;  is allowed to - but does not have to - depend on   in the cheap talk spirit of
messages acquiring their meaning endogenously.)
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 (m) is obtained from f(:);m1(:); :::;mn(:) through Bayesrule whenever m = m ()
for some  2 .17
It will sometimes be convenient to abuse notation by using   to denote the equilibrium
containing strategy prole  .
For simplicity and without loss of generality for equilibrium play, assume throughout this
paper that, in any strategy prole  , every message in Mi is equivalent to a message in M i .
3 Examples and Basic Denitions
This section presents examples of equilibria in multi-sender cheap talk to illustrate that: i)
they can be unintuitive, and ii) the set of equilibria is extremely di¢ cult to characterize.
In each of these examples, there are two senders, and the parameters follow the popular
uniform-quadratic specication:   U [0; 1] and ui(a; ) =  (a   ( + bi))2 (with bR = 0),
so for all , sender is utility is maximized at + bi. In both examples, every message vector
in ni=1M i occurs in equilibrium, so any criterion that only places restrictions on out-of-
equilibrium beliefs, such as Battaglinis (2002), would not rule out any of these equilibria.
These examples feature pairs of messages (m1;m2) that are sent in some nontrivial in-
terval, but not at all (or almost all) states where they form mutual best responses. This
papers robustness concept selects equilibria where such an issue does not arise.
Example 1: No Interval Structure
Suppose b1 = b2 = 0:04. Each sender has two equilibrium messages, x and y. The
prescribed message vector m () is:
- (x; x) if  2 [0; 0:01]nQ;
- (y; y) if  2 ([0; 0:01] \Q) [ (0:01; 0:18];
- (x; y) if  2 (0:18; 0:51] [ ((0:51; 1] \Q);
- (y; x) if  2 (0:51; 1]nQ.
It is easy to check that the receivers optimal actions are a (x; x) = 0:005, a (y; y) =
0:095, a (x; y) = 0:345 and a (y; x) = 0:755, and that this prole is indeed part of an
equilibrium. As a result, within [0; 0:01], the action following a rational state is 0:095, while
the action following an irrational state is 0:005; a similar situation arises within (0:51; 1].
Thus, outside of [0:01; 0:51], there is no nontrivial interval of states following which the same
messages are sent.
17Sendersstrategies and  must be such that the receivers expected utility is well-dened. In particular,
sendersstrategies must be measurable, which implies that  (m) is also measurable, for all m.
8
Clearly, (x; x) and (y; y) are both mutual best responses on (0; 0:01), and to avoid sending
(x; y) or (y; x), the senders must coordinate in a very precise manner that would be di¢ cult
if they observe the true state with noise that has a continuous distribution. Senders face a
similar problem on (0:51; 1).
Example 1 does not have "interval structure" in the following sense. For convenience, let
(:) denote the Lebesgue measure.
Denition: Given a pure-strategy prole  , a cell in   is a maximal interval18 of states
throughout which m  remains constant. A proper cell is a cell with positive measure.
Denition: A pure-strategy prole   has interval structure if ([I is a proper cell in  I) =
().
Example 2: Convoluted Finite Interval Structure
This example is taken from Ambrus and Lu (2014), and shows that even an equilibrium
revealing a nite partition of the state space may seem implausible.
Suppose b1 and b2 are small, and divide  into q equally sized blocks, each of which is
divided into q equally sized cells. Both senders messages are labeled 1; 2; :::; q and are used
as follows (see Figure 1):
- sender 1 sends message k in the kth cell of each block;
- sender 2 sends message k+ l 1(mod q) in the kth cell of the lth block (when the formula
gives 0, message q is sent).
Figure 1: Example 2
This prole guarantees that every message vector in f1; :::; qgf1; :::; qg occurs in exactly
one cell, and that any deviation leads to an action at least almost a block away when q is
large. Thus, if the biases b1 and b2 are small with respect to , then the number of blocks can
be large. Therefore, xing the biases, this construction can yield an almost fully revealing
equilibrium as  becomes large.
However, this construction appears to be asking too much of the senders, whose messages
must change very frequently at boundaries between cells. These boundaries are arbitrarily
18That is, m  does not remain constant in any connected strict superset of a cell. Cells can be degenerate
intervals (i.e. they can consist of a single state).
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set: for example, with large enough blocks, (1; 1) and (2; 2) are pairs of mutual best responses
anywhere in block 1 su¢ ciently far from block 2, so the boundary  between these cells can be
moved. With noise in the sendersobservations, near , both senders can be very uncertain
about the message used by the other sender, which can lead to a coordination failure.19
4 Coordination-Free Equilibria
This section proposes a class of "coordination-free" equilibria and derives some of their
properties. The main results of this paper show that coordination-freeness is essentially
required for satisfying the robustness concepts proposed in Section 5.
4.1 Denition
Coordination-free equilibria are dened as follows.
Denition: An equilibrium   is coordination-free if it satises points 1 and 2 below,
and strictly coordination-free if it satises points 1-3.
1. Every cell in   (other than, if present, f0g or f1g) is proper, and if  6= 1 (resp.  6= 0)
is the supremum (resp. inmum) of a cell, then it is also the inmum (resp. supremum)
of another cell.
2. The message vectors sent in any two adjacent cells in   di¤er in exactly one component.
3. If an out-of-equilibrium message vector m0 di¤ers from the message vector m sent in
cell C in only its ith component, then ui(a (m); ) 6= ui(a (m0); ) for all  2 C, where
C denotes the closure of C.
Point 2 implies, by Assumption A, that the induced action di¤ers in any two adjacent
cells, and ensures that   does not rely on coordination in the following sense. Consider a
boundary b between two cells where sender is equilibrium messages mi and m0i di¤er while
senders j 6= i play mj. Point 2 implies that mj is approximately optimal for j regardless of
whether sender i sends mi or m0i and of whether the state is to the left or to the right of
19However, if the noise is in a class such that both senders observe the true state with probability near
1, then senders are able to successfully coordinate. This observation illustrates the di¤erence between this
paper and Ambrus and Lu (2014).
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the boundary. That is, even if sender i makes a "mistake" and sends the wrong message, no
other sender would have a strong incentive to coordinate with i by changing their message.
Point 3 ensures that   does not rely on coordination in another sense: since i is always
strictly worse o¤ switching to a message that leads to an out-of-equilibrium message vector
m0 (i.e. m0 2 ni=1M i such that m0 6= m (0) for any 0 2 ), the other senders may nd it
less plausible that i would make such a switch. Because, as Proposition 1 will show, there
are nitely many cells in any coordination-free equilibrium, point 3 rules out only a nite
number of values for a (m0).
In the one-sender case, every equilibrium is coordination-free, and strictly so since every
message is (equivalent to) an on-path message.
Example 3: A Multi-Sender Strictly Coordination-Free Equilibrium
As in Section 3, consider a uniform-quadratic setting with two senders. Suppose b1 =
0:01, b2 = 0:1. Each sender has two equilibrium messages, x and y. The prescribed message
vector m () is:
- (x; x) if  2 [0; 0:01];
- (y; x) if  2 (0:01; 0:06];
- (y; y) if  2 (0:06; 0:51];
- (x; y) if  2 (0:51; 1].
The receiver maps every message to x or y, derives beliefs from Bayesrule, and optimally
responds: a (x; x) = 0:005, a (y; x) = 0:035, a (y; y) = 0:285 and a (x; y) = 0:755.
It is straightforward to check that the above describes a strictly coordination-free equi-
librium. (Point 3 of the denition is vacuous here since every message vector in ni=1M i
occurs on path.)
4.2 Basic Properties
This subsection presents some properties of coordination-free equilibria.
Proposition 1: The number of cells in any coordination-free equilibrium   is bounded
above by ()

, and every other cell must have size greater than .
Proof: Let b be the boundary between two adjacent cells in  . Since the message
vectors sent in those cells, denoted m for the right cell and m0 for the left cell, di¤er in
exactly one component, there must exist a sender i such that ui(a (m); b) = ui(a (m0); b).
By single-crossing, ui(a (m); ) T ui(a (m0); ) for all  T b. As a result, m cannot occur
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to the left of b, and m0 cannot occur to the right of b, which implies a (m)  b  a (m0).
Since a (m) 6= a (m0), they must occur on di¤erent sides of b + bi(b), so we also have
a (m) > b + bi(b) > a
 (m0) (and thus b + bi(b) =2 f0; 1g, which implies jbi(b)j   > 0).
Combining these observations yields:
i) a (m)  a (m0) > , implying the bound on the number of cells, and
ii) either a (m) > b +  or b    > a (m0), implying that at least one of the two cells
has size greater than . 
Proposition 1 makes clear that for any xed , coordination-free equilibria are bounded
away from full revelation: it is not possible to increase information transmission beyond
a certain bound, be it by expanding the state space (as in Ambrus and Lu (2014)) or by
adding senders (as in Rubanov (2015)). Of course, as  ! 0, the upper bound on information
transmission approaches full revelation, just like in Crawford and Sobel (1982).
Another property of coordination-free equilibrium play (i.e. the collection of on-path
induced actions and cell endpoints) is that it can be computed using the forward solution
procedure of Crawford and Sobel (1982), given an ordered list stating the identity of the
sender whose message changes at each boundary between two cells.20 Given the receivers
leftmost action, denoted 1, the location of the leftmost cells right endpoint, denoted 2,
is determined by the prior and uR. The indi¤erent sender at 2 is given by the list, and
her indi¤erence condition pins down the receivers second leftmost action, and so on. If the
last cells right endpoint coincides with the right endpoint of , play computed through
this procedure is called candidate play. Clearly, play in a coordination-free equilibrium must
be candidate play. Moreover, if all cell endpoints calculated through forward solution are
monotonic in 2,21 then the number of candidate play corresponding to each given ordered
list of indi¤erent senders is either zero (if the list is too long) or one.
However, unlike in the one-sender case, not all candidate play corresponds to play in an
equilibrium - see Online Appendix A for an example. The reason is that there may be an
out-of-equilibrium vector m such that any value of a (m) induces a protable deviation by
a sender. Proposition 7 in Online Appendix A identies a su¢ cient condition under which
this problem does not arise. This condition is typically satised by su¢ ciently informative
candidate play if there is at least one sender with a small bias in each direction, and senders
preferences are not too asymmetric.
20In the one-sender case, this sender is trivially always the only sender, and the length of the list determines
the number of intervals in equilibrium.
21This is Crawford and Sobels (1982) condition (M), and is satised in the uniform-quadratic case.
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A related observation is that if multiple senders have identical preferences, then delet-
ing all but one of them does not change the set of possible candidate play. Doing so may,
however, shrink the set of equilibria, because it removes ways of assigning messages. Never-
theless, Proposition 7 implies that under the assumptions of the previous paragraph, deleting
duplicate senders does not prevent the most informative candidate play from being part of
a coordination-free equilibrium, and therefore does not a¤ect the receivers maximum wel-
fare achievable in a coordination-free equilibrium. Section 6 presents further results about
receiver welfare and sender selection.
5 Robustness
This section introduces the possibility of small noise in the senders observations of the
state, and studies equilibria   that, for any  > 0, remain -equilibria with any su¢ ciently
small noise. Such equilibria are called strongly robust when small noise means that senders
signals are near the true state with high probability, and robust when small noise means
that senderssignals are near the true state for sure. These concepts are formally dened in
Sections 5.1 to 5.3. The main results of the paper, Theorems 1 and 2, are stated below and
fully presented in Sections 5.2 to 5.4.
The following denitions are used in Theorems 1 and 2.
Denition: An equilibrium   is complete if every (m1; :::;mn) 2 ni=1M i occurs in
equilibrium.
That is,   is complete if no combination of equilibrium messages is an out-of-equilibrium
message vector. Examples 1, 2 and 3 all feature complete equilibria. Note that any complete
and coordination-free equilibrium is also strictly coordination-free.
Denition: Two equilibria are equivalent if at all but a nite number of states, the same
messages are sent, and the receivers strategy is the same.
Denition: A statement holds generically if it holds for an open and dense set of vectors
of primitives (u1; :::; un; uR; f) (within the set satisfying the assumptions from Section 2) un-







i=1;:::;n;R kui   u0ik2 + kf   f 0k2,
where k  k denotes the sup norm.
For Theorems 1 and 2, let   be an equilibrium of the noiseless cheap talk game.
Theorem 1:
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(a) Generically, if   is strongly robust, then it is complete and coordination-free.
(b) If   is complete and coordination-free, and no cell in   is f0g or f1g, then it is
strongly robust.
Theorem 2:
(a) Generically, if   is robust, then it is equivalent to a strictly coordination-free equilib-
rium.
(b) If   is strictly coordination-free, then it is robust.
5.1 Noise and Perturbations
Conditional on state , each sender i observes a signal si 2 , whose density is measurable
on .22 In the noiseless game, we simply have si = . The meaning of "small noise" is
formalized below:
Denition: Noise has size less than " if:
1. for all i 2 N and  2 , Pr(jsi   j < "j)  1  "; and
2. for all i 2 N and si 2 , Pr(jsi   j < "jsi)  1  ".
Denition: Noise has local size less than " if for all i 2 N and  2 , jsi j < " surely.
The rst denition is inspired by the Ky Fan metric. It says that noise is small when at
any state, each senders signal is close to the state with high probability, and when after any
signal, each sender puts a high probability on the state being close to the signal. It does not
rule out the presence of atoms, so for example, the class of "replacement noise" sequences
considered by Battaglini (2002), Section 3 of Ambrus and Lu (2014) and Rubanov (2015),
where each sender observes the true state with probability approaching 1 and observes the
realization of a continuous random variable with full support otherwise, has size converging
to 0. A sequence of noise with size converging to 0 converges in probability to the trivial
signal structure si = .
The second denition is more stringent, as it requires that signals be always close to the
state. Such small support is consistent with perturbations in the global games literature.
Replacement noise does not have local size converging to 0 even as the probability of observ-
ing the true state approaches 1. However, a sequence of noise along which senders observe
22This papers results do not depend on whether the signals are restricted to be independent, conditional
on .
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the closest element of a ner and ner nite grid has (local) size converging to 0. A sequence
of noise with local size converging to 0 converges surely to the trivial signal structure si = .
Denoting the probability that agent i puts on event X as Pri(X), given these denitions,
common knowledge that noise has size less than " means common knowledge that, for any
; sj 2 , agent i and sender j, Pri(jsj   j < "j)  1  " and Pri(jsj   j < "jsj)  1  ".
Similarly, common knowledge that noise has local size less than " means common knowledge
that jsj   j < " for all senders j 2 N .
Finally, message vectors m 2 ni=1M i that are o¤-path in the noiseless game can remain
o¤-path with some small local noise . The receiver could then have any beliefs after such
m, and thus any optimal action a(m), even when there is common knowledge that noise
has local size less than ", for any " > 0. It is then impossible for a(m) to be near a (m)
for all beliefs consistent with ; if robustness were to require this, it would rule out o¤-path
message vectors and thus imply completeness, which would nullify the e¤ect of the restriction
to local noise. To address this issue, the robustness concept for Theorem 2 applies a di¤erent
(and weaker) requirement to o¤-path message vectors, which assumes that perturbations on
the receivers o¤-path beliefs are small in the following sense:
Denition: A perturbation on the receivers o¤-path beliefs in   has size less than  if,
for any message vector m that is o¤-path in  , the receivers belief after m is such that the
optimal action a(m) satises ja(m)  a (m)j < .
5.2 Strong Robustness
This subsection presents the denition of strong robustness and Theorem 1.
Denition: Player is strategy ri is a -best response to opponent strategies r i if
after any history hi (signal si if i is a sender and message vector if i is the receiver),
E[ui(ri; r i)jhi]  E[ui(r0i; r i)jhi]   for any strategy r0i.
Denition: An equilibrium   in the noiseless game is strongly robust if, for every  > 0,
there exists " > 0 such that whenever noise has size less than ", each players strategy r i
(m i for senders and a
  for the receiver) is a -best response to r  i evaluated under sender
is belief about the noise.
The above denition can be used either requiring common prior about the noise, or
allowing a larger class of perturbations where it is common knowledge that noise has size
15
less than " (but playerspriors may di¤er). The former leads to a weaker notion of robustness
than the latter. Theorem 1 holds with either interpretation.
Given that small noise can change a senders optimal message around cell boundaries even
in the one-sender case, insisting on   remaining an exact best response in the noisy game
appears too strong. One interpretation for instead requiring approximate best responses
might be that players incur a small cost when deviating from their noiseless plan of action.
For example, if a player is a committee, it may not be worth convening a meeting to determine
a new strategy when a perturbation makes the original messages slightly suboptimal (for
senders) or only slightly changes the optimal actions (for the receiver). Alternatively, the
noiseless equilibrium may represent an established convention, and it may be costly for a
player to compute an alternative, slightly preferable, course of action. Thus, an equilibrium
is strongly robust when for any positive tolerance of suboptimality, if noise is small enough,
everyone can be expected to stick with her noiseless equilibrium strategy.23
Recall the statement of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: Consider an equilibrium   of the noiseless cheap talk game.
(a) Generically, if   is strongly robust, then it is complete and coordination-free.
(b) If   is complete and coordination-free, and no cell in   is f0g or f1g, then it is
strongly robust.
The appendix presents all omitted proofs. Theorem 1 holds with either common-prior
small noise or only common knowledge that noise is small. The proof makes the weaker
assumption for each part of the result (the former for Theorem 1a, and the latter for Theorem
1b).
Theorem 1a follows from Lemmata 1 and 2, discussed below, and Proposition 4a, stated
below and discussed in Section 5.4.24 Because   is trivially coordination-free when jfi 2 N :
jM i j  2gj = 1, the proof assumes jfi 2 N : jM i j  2gj  2.
Lemma 1: If   is strongly robust, then it has interval structure, and ( (m)) > 0 for
every m 2 ni=1M i (which implies completeness).
23See Jackson et al. (2012) for a discussion of "-equilibria. Their main result, that selection criteria based
on "-equilibria of perturbed games have no power, does not apply to the setting considered here: interim
optimality with a continuum of types and discontinuous strategies. It does highlight that conditions similar
to the robustness concept used here are likely to be weak when applied to settings with nitely many types.
24The numbering of Proposition 4, as well as the position of its proof in the appendix, corresponds to its
position in Section 5.4.
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The proof of Lemma 1 has four steps. First, it is shown from the denition of robustness
that a(m), the receivers best response to sender strategies in   under noise , must be
close to a (m) whenever  is small. That is, if noise is added and players keep playing  ,
then the receivers action must be almost optimal.
Second,   must be complete. If not, then given an o¤-path message vector m 2 ni=1M i ,
one can easily specify small noise  such thatm is most likely to be observed far from a (m).
For example, consider a fully revealing equilibrium, and suppose that the noise is such that
erroneous signals are much more likely when   0:5. Then a sender i with bias 0:1 might
want to deviate when si  0:4 in order to induce the receiver to take an action near 0:5. For
simplicity, the noise used in the proof has an atomic distribution, but the argument can be
made with more standard distributions as well. The key point is that when m is o¤-path,
the optimal action after m is very sensitive to the form of the noise.
Third, steps 3 and 4 establish that   must have interval structure. Step 3 shows that
every message vector in ni=1M i must be sent on a set of positive measure. Suppose instead
that some m is sent on a set of measure zero. Then once again, the receivers optimal
response to m would be very sensitive to small noise because the set of states where the
receiver expects m can change considerably. For example, if a message vector m is sent
only at 0:1 and 0:9, then with noise, the receiver may believe the m is much more likely to
occur when the state is near 0:9 than 0:1, which can make the best response to m very far
from a (m). Once again, this idea does not require extreme noise distributions like the one
used in the proof for ease of exposition. Step 4 uses a similar argument to show that, even
when every m 2 ni=1M i were sent on a set of positive measure, if   fails to have interval
structure, then the best response to m is very sensitive to noise that makes it di¢ cult to
observe signals inside  (m) but outside a proper cell.
Lemma 2 refers to a property of cells dened as follows.
Denitions: For a given strategy prole   with interval structure,
 b is a left-natural boundary for sender i if it is the right endpoint of a proper cell25 in
 , and, denoting the message vector sent in that cell by m, 9m00i 2M i such that:
(m00i ;m i) = m
 () for some  2 ,
ui(a
 (mi;m i); b) = ui(a (m00i ;m i); b), and a
 (mi;m i) < a (m00i ;m i);
 b is a right-natural boundary for sender i if it is the left endpoint of a proper cell in
25Formally, if S denotes the cell, b = supS.
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 a proper cell is natural if its right endpoint is either left-natural or 1, and its left
endpoint is either right-natural or 0.
Thus, a cell endpoint b is a left(right)-natural boundary if, coming from the left(right),
some sender would change her message at b even if others do not, and the message vector
resulting from this change occurs on path. That is, the cell stops at b "naturally" in the
sense that: (i) given the receivers strategy, if the cell extends any further, a sender would
have a protable deviation; and (ii) this deviation would lead to an action of the receiver
that is determined by on-path play (as opposed to o¤-path beliefs). In Example 2, the cell
endpoints are not natural boundaries: the senders locally coordinate with each other to avoid
designating a cell in another block, so a senders best response at a boundary changes only
because the other senders message changes.
Denition: A strategy prole is natural if it has interval structure and all of its proper
cells are natural.
Lemma 2: If   is strongly robust, then   is natural.
Lemma 2 shows that any right endpoint b 6= 1 of a proper cell C in a strongly robust
  must be left-natural. Denote the message vector sent in C by m. The proof uses single-
crossing and Assumption A to show that, if b were not left-natural, then for any i 2 N ,
sender is unique approximate best response at b to m i is mi. Therefore, given si near b
and noise  such that sender i believes that, with high probability, all other senderssignals
are in C, sender is only nearly optimal message is mi. Since b is the right endpoint of
C, there must be at least at least one sender j whose message di¤ers from mj at or just to
the right of b. Therefore, there exists noise  arbitrarily small such that j fails to play an
approximate best response at or just to the right of b.
Proposition 4a: Generically, if   is natural and every message vector in ni=1M i is sent
on a set of positive measure, then   is coordination-free.
Proposition 4a is discussed in Section 5.4, which also shows that all coordination-free
equilibria are natural. The two concepts di¤er when, in a natural equilibrium, a cell boundary
fails to be left-natural and right-natural for the same sender.
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The proof of Theorem 1b shows that, without noise, at all states in a coordination-free
equilibrium  , any sender is message is either optimal or very close to being optimal for
all m i occurring in a small enough neighborhood - there is no strong reason to coordinate
with other senders. (This cannot hold in any equilibrium that is not natural.) Thus, every
sender follows a -best response by playing the original prole as long as she believes that
noise is small. The same holds for the receiver since, as long as noise is less than ", the
message vector following every state at least " away from boundaries must be the same as
in the noiseless game with high probability.
5.3 Robustness
The completeness result in Theorem 1a is quite restrictive. For example, it implies that the
number of cells in   is equal to i2N jM i j, and thus rules out equilibria where: (i) two or
more senders are informative, and (ii) the number of cells is a prime. As the intuition for step
2 of the proof of Lemma 1 suggests, completeness comes from the fact that when noise has
full support, any pair of messages can be sent in any state. Therefore, a logical step in the
analysis is to examine a more restrictive class of noise distributions: those with small local
size. However, as explained in Section 5.1, restricting only noise on the sendersobservation
of the state does not get rid of completeness: perturbations on the receivers o¤-path beliefs
must also be restricted. The proposed robustness concept will therefore be similar to strong
robustness on path, but di¤er from it o¤ path.
Denition: Player is strategy ri is an on-path -best response to opponent strate-
gies r i if after any history hi that can be reached given is belief about noise and r i,
E[ui(ri; r i)jhi]  E[ui(r0i; r i)jhi]   for any strategy r0i.
Denition: An equilibrium   in the noiseless game is robust if:
1. for every  > 0, there exists " > 0 such that whenever noise has local size less than ",
each players strategy r i is an on-path -best response to r
 
 i evaluated under sender
is belief about the noise, and
2. in the noiseless game, there exists  > 0 such that whenever the perturbation on the
receivers o¤-path beliefs has size less than , every senders strategy m i is a best
response to m  i and a
 , where a  denotes the receivers best-response to m  and her
perturbed o¤-path beliefs.
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Point 1 of this denition is exactly the same as the denition of strong robustness,
except for the qualiers "on-path" (for -best response) and "local" (for noise size). In fact,
without the word "local," robustness would exactly coincide with strong robustness: because
the latter implies completeness, both the "on-path" qualier and point 2 of the denition
of robustness would have no e¤ect. Therefore, strong robustness corresponds to robustness,
but with a larger class of noise.
As argued previously, applying point 1 to message vectors m that are o¤-path even given
noise is too strong: the receivers beliefs after such m can be any distribution over . At
the same time, not perturbing beliefs after such m at all is unappealing: it seems unlikely
that o¤-path beliefs are less subject to perturbations than on-path beliefs. Therefore, point
2 of the above denition requires   to survive small perturbations on o¤-path beliefs. Unlike
in point 1, exact best response is required: since sendersstrategies always remain nearly
optimal for small changes in the receivers actions, requiring -best response would render
point 2 vacuous.
One interpretation of point 2 is that senders know approximately, but not exactly, what
the receiver would do o¤ path. Therefore, robustness requires that their strategies remain
optimal even when their beliefs about the receivers o¤-path actions di¤er slightly from the
receivers actual strategy.
Theorem 2: Consider an equilibrium   of the noiseless cheap talk game.
(a) Generically, if   is robust, then it is equivalent to a strictly coordination-free equilib-
rium.
(b) If   is strictly coordination-free, then it is robust.
Like Theorem 1, Theorem 2 holds whether robustness is understood to hold only with
common-prior small local noise, or more broadly when there is common knowledge that noise
is local and small. Once again, the proof makes the weaker assumption for each part of the
theorem.
Theorem 2a follows from the following results.
Lemma 3: If   is robust, then   is natural and satises point 3 of the denition of
strictly coordination-free equilibrium.
Proposition 4b: Generically, if   is natural, then   is equivalent to a coordination-free
equilibrium.
Proposition 4b is discussed with Proposition 4a in Section 5.4.
Lemma 3 is the counterpart of Lemmata 1 and 2. The main di¤erence between the proofs
is the replacement of steps 2 and 3 in the proof of Lemma 1. Instead, step 2 in the proof of
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Lemma 3 shows that m 2 ni=1M i must be sent on a set of positive measure if m is sent at
two or more states. The intuition is similar to the one for step 3 in the proof of Lemma 1,
but the result does not apply to all m due to the lack of completeness.
Step 3 in the proof of Lemma 3 argues that the set of fully revealed states in   has
measure zero. If not, then for any " > 0, there would exist an interval I of size " that
includes a continuum of fully revealed states. Let  be one such state, m = m (), and
i be a sender with a continuum of messages in I. Then for any m0i in this continuum of
messages, point 2 of the denition of robustness implies that a (m0i;m i) must be far from
: otherwise, slightly changing it would induce a sender deviation. The rest of step 3 uses
this fact and step 2 to show that, in fact, there can only be countably many such m0i.
The remainder of the proof of Lemma 3 follows the proof of Lemmata 1 and 2, with point 2
of the denition of robustness (which implies point 3 of the denition of strictly coordination-
free equilibrium) ensuring that messages m0i such that (m
0
i;m i) is out-of-equilibrium are not
approximately optimal.
Theorem 2b is proved in the same way as Theorem 1b, but additional cases must be
checked due to the potential presence of out-of-equilibrium message vectors and cells f0g
and f1g.
5.4 Relation between Coordination-Free and Natural Equilibria
Proposition 2 establishes basic properties of natural equilibria that are useful for the com-
parison with coordination-free equilibria.
Proposition 2:
(a) In any natural equilibrium  ,  (m) is connected whenever ( (m)) > 0.
(b) In each game, there is a nite upper bound for the number of cells in natural equilibria.
The reasoning for Proposition 2a is simple: by the denition of natural boundary, m
ceases to be optimal at the endpoints of any proper cell where m is sent - and there must be
such a cell because   has interval structure and m is sent on a positive-measure set. Single
crossing then implies that  (m) is connected. The proof of Proposition 2b notes that for
every action a induced in a proper cell whose left endpoint L is not 0, because L must be
right-natural, there must be another induced action a0 at least  to the left of a such that the
message vectors inducing a and a0 di¤er in one component. An inductive argument, starting
with the interval [0; ], is then used to obtain the result.
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The remainder of Section 5 argues that generically, a natural equilibrium features the
same play as some coordination-free equilibrium at almost all states. Proposition 3 shows
that one direction of this relation is simple.
Proposition 3: Every coordination-free equilibrium is natural.
Proof: If an equilibrium   is coordination-free, then at every cell endpoint ,
ui(a
 (mi;m i); ) = ui(a (m0i;m i); ) for some sender i,
where (mi;m i) is sent in the left cell and (m0i;m i) is sent in the right cell. Moreover, by
denition, a (mi;m i) 6= a (m0i;m i), so  is a natural boundary. Thus   is natural. 
The partial converse of Proposition 3 is more complicated.
Proposition 4: Generically,
(a) If   is natural and every message vector inni=1M i is sent on a set of positive measure,
then   is coordination-free.
(b) If   is natural, then   is equivalent to a coordination-free equilibrium.
The intuition for Proposition 4 is as follows. Suppose prole   is natural. Label the
proper cells 0; :::; K from left to right, and let mk denote the message vector sent in cell k.
Let:
 0 = 0 and 2K+2 = 1;
 2k denote the boundary between cell k   1 and cell k;
 2k+1 denote the action induced in cell k, i.e. 2k+1 = a (mk);
 ikR (resp. ikL) denote a sender for whom the boundary between cell k   1 and k is
right-natural (resp. left-natural);
 Rk < 2k + 1 be such that uikR(2k+1; 2k) = uikR(Rk ; 2k) (Rk 2 N exists because 2k
is right-natural); and
 Lk > 2k  1 be such that uikL(2k 1; 2k) = uikL(Lk ; 2k) (Lk 2 N exists because 2k is
left-natural).
Denition: The structure of   consists of fikRgKk=1; fikLgKk=1; fRkgKk=1 and fLkgKk=1.26
fikRgKk=1 and fRkgKk=1 form the right-structure, while fikLgKk=1 and fLkgKk=1 form the left-
structure.
26A given prole may be described by more than one structure, as there may happen to be multiple ikRs
or ikLs at a boundary k.
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By Proposition 2b, K is bounded above, so the number of possible structures is nite.
A natural equilibriums right-structure and 1 (or 2) fully determine the action induced
at every state that is not a boundary: given 1, the receivers utility function and the prior
density uniquely determine 2 (and vice versa). Then given 2, i1Rs utility function and
R1 uniquely determine 3, and so on. 1 needs to be such that cell Ks right endpoint is at
1. When Rk = 2k   1 for all k, this procedure is the same as the forward solution used to
compute single-sender and coordination-free equilibria.
Suppose   is coordination-free. Here, for all k = 1; :::; K, it must be that Rk = 2k   1,
Lk = 2k + 1 and ikR = ikL. Thus, the left-structure is redundant with the right-structure,
and does not impose any additional condition for   to be an equilibrium.
By contrast, if play in a natural equilibrium   does not correspond to play in a coordination-
free equilibrium in all cell interiors, then at some boundary k, multiple senders change their
message. Proposition 2a implies that in a natural equilibrium, if a message vector is sent in a
proper cell, then no other on-path message vector can induce the same action. This implies
that Rk 6= 2k   1 and Lk 6= 2k + 1. Thus in this case, the left-structure imposes a sup-
plementary indi¤erence condition. Since the right-structure has already xed all boundaries
and actions, extra conditions imposed by the left-structure are generically not satised.
Example 4 shows that one can build a natural equilibrium that is not coordination-free
given non-generic primitives.
Example 4: Natural Equilibrium that Is Not Coordination-Free
Consider a two-player game that follows the uniform quadratic specication, except that
player 1s bias b1() is not constant. Instead, b1() = 0:04 for   0:1, and is continuous
and increasing for  > 0:1. Player 2s bias is constant at b2 =  0:02.
We look for a six-cell natural equilibrium with the following structure (following the above
notation, from left to right, the cells are labeled 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, the receivers actions are
1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11, and the boundaries between cells are 2, 4, 6, 8 and 10):
- right-structure: i1R = 1, i2R = i3R = i4R = i5R = 2, R1 = 1, R2 = 3, R3 = 5, R4 = 1,
R5 = 9;
- left-structure: i1L = i4L = 1, i2L = i3L = i5L = 2, L1 = 3, L2 = 5, L3 = 7, L4 = 11,
L5 = 11.
Note that at 2, 4, 6 and 10, the structure identies a single player that is indi¤erent
between the adjacent actions. However, at 8, we must have u2(1; 8) = u2(9; 8) and
u1(7; 8) = u1(11; 8). Since neither sender is indi¤erent between 7 and 9 at 8, such an
equilibrium cannot be coordination-free.
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It is straightforward to show that in order for an equilibrium to have the specied right-
structure, we must have 1 = 1900 , 2 =
2
900
, 3 = 75900 , 4 =
148
900
, 5 = 185900 , 6 =
222
900




, 9 = 411900 , 10 =
598
900















If this non-generic condition is satised, then the following sender strategies are part of a
natural equilibrium with the above structure:
- if  2 [0; 2
900
), m() = (x; x);




), m() = (y; x);




), m() = (y; y);




), m() = (y; z);




), m() = (x; y); and
- if  2 [598
900
; 1], m() = (x; z).
6 Best Coordination-Free Equilibrium for the Receiver
Let the receivers maximum expected utility from a coordination-free equilibrium be uR.
This section studies how uR depends on the characteristics of senders available, and all of
the analysis here also applies to strictly coordination-free equilibria.
It is not always the case that replacing a sender by a less biased one will increase uR.
Example 5 shows that doing so may decrease uR, even in the uniform-quadratic specication.
Example 5: Consider a uniform-quadratic game with two senders, where b1 = 0:075
and b2 =  0:0525. It is easy to check that the following strategy prole   is part of a
coordination-free equilibrium:
- If  2 [0; 0:008), m1 = 1 and m2 = 1. a (1; 1) = 0:004.
- If  2 [0:008; 0:316), m1 = 2 and m2 = 1. a (2; 1) = 0:162.
- If  2 [0:316; 0:414), m1 = 2 and m2 = 2. a (2; 2) = 0:365.
- If  2 [0:414; 0:812), m1 = 3 and m2 = 2. a (3; 2) = 0:613.
- If  2 [0:812; 1], m1 = 3 and m2 = 3. a (3; 3) = 0:906.
- a (1; 2) = a (1; 3) = 0:2, a (2; 3) = 0:5 and a (3; 1) = 0, so that no deviation to an
out-of-equilibrium vector is induced.
The receivers expected utility from   is approximately  0:008321.
Now suppose sender 2 becomes less biased, so that b2 =  0:05. It is easy to check that
the following strategy prole  0 is part of a coordination-free equilibrium:
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- If  2 [0; 0:3), m1 = 1 and m2 = 1. a (1; 1) = 0:15.
- If  2 [0:3; 0:4), m1 = 1 and m2 = 2. a (1; 2) = 0:35.
- If  2 [0:4; 0:8), m1 = 2 and m2 = 2. a (2; 2) = 0:6.
- If  2 [0:8; 1], m1 = 2 and m2 = 1. a (2; 1) = 0:9.
Because sender 2s bias is now smaller, the cell size decreases less from left to right at
boundaries where sender 2 switches message. As a result, it can be shown that there can now
be at most 4 nontrivial cells, and that of these,  0 is the best one for the receiver, with an
expected utility of   1
120
  0:008333.27 Therefore, uR has decreased even though sender 2
has become less biased.
Note that because the set of coordination-free equilibria is straightforward to compute,
it was possible in Example 5 to nd the receivers best coordination-free equilibrium.
If all senders are biased in the same direction, the anomaly illustrated by Example 5 does
not arise. In fact, Proposition 5 shows that in this case, even when multiple senders are
available, only the least biased sender is informative in the receivers optimal coordination-
free equilibrium. The intuition is that if the sender whose message changes at a boundary is
not the least biased, then replacing her by the least biased sender (while keeping the number
of cells intact) must shrink the largest cells and expand the smallest ones, which increases
the receivers expected welfare.
Proposition 5: Consider the uniform-quadratic case where mini bi = b > 0. In the
receivers optimal coordination-free equilibrium, any sender whose bias exceeds b babbles.
Under the uniform-quadratic specication, if there are senders biased in both directions,
and the receiver must choose two senders, picking the least biased sender in each direction
should be near optimal in the sense of maximizing uR. The intuition is as follows: the receiver
would like to keep the size of cells to a minimum. If both chosen senders are biased in the
same direction, then the cell sizes can only increase in that direction, eventually resulting
in very large intervals. Therefore, the receiver should ensure that senders have opposite
biases. Furthermore, the smaller a senders bias, the slower cells grow in the direction of the
bias, and the earlier that sender can be used to reduce cell size when going in the opposite
direction.
27 0 has cell sizes (0:1; 0:2; 0:3; 0:4). The other coordination-free equilibria with four nontrivial intervals
have cell sizes (0:025; 0:225; 0:325; 0:425), (0:05; 0:15; 0:35; 0:45) and (0:075; 0:175; 0:275; 0:475), which all yield
lower expected utility. With three intervals, even if there were an equilibrium where the intervals were equally
sized, the receiver would still be worse o¤, with an expected utility of   1108 .
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As Example 5 suggests, it is di¢ cult to precisely characterize the optimal choice of
senders in general. However, in the limit as  becomes large relative to the biases,28 the
above intuition is exactly conrmed.
Proposition 6: Take a sequence flg where each l is a closed interval and (l) l!1!
1. In the uniform-quadratic case with two senders that have biases  b2 and b1, where
b1; b2 > 0 and b1b2 =2 Q, then:
(a) in any sequence of coordination-free equilibria f lg where each  l has the maximum
number of cells in a coordination-free equilibrium, the fraction of cells with size in any
interval I  [0; 4(b1 + b2)] converges to (I)4(b1+b2) as l!1;






Proposition 6a states that if sender biases are  b2 < 0 < b1 and satisfy b1b2 =2 Q, the distri-
bution of cell sizes in coordination-free equilibria maximizing the number of cells converges
to U [0; 4(b1 + b2)] as ()!1. The proposition is proved by showing that the number of
cells is not maximized if any cells size exceeds 4(b1 + b2). Given this restriction, the size
of the leftmost cell uniquely determines the sequence of cell sizes because at each boundary,
cell size must either increase by 4b1 or decrease by 4b2. As this sequence become longer, the
distribution of its elements converges to U [0; 4(b1 + b2)] whenever b1b2 =2 Q.
Proposition 6b states that the receivers limit maximum expected utility corresponds to
the distribution of cell sizes from Proposition 6a. It implies that if the receiver is choosing
two senders from a nite pool, then generically29, in the limit ()!1, the best choice is
to pick the least biased sender in each direction. Moreover, the advantage from consulting
senders with opposite biases is striking: if all sendersbiases were in the same direction, then
as ()!1, uR !  1.
Coordination-free equilibria can also be used to study games with more than two senders.
For example, does limiting the number of senders to two (with biases  b2 < 0 < b1) dramat-
ically increase cell sizes relative to consulting more senders with biases within ( 1; b2] [
[b1;1)? Recall that in the uniform-quadratic case, from left to right, cell size either in-
creases by 4b1 or decreases by 4b2 at each boundary. With two senders, the lower bound on
28Unlike in the rest of this paper, Proposition 6 allows  to vary. One could state an equivalent result
holding  = [0; 1] xed by scaling the playerspreferences. Varying  and xing preferences simplies the
exposition.
29That is, if for any two senders i and j, bibj =2 Q.
26
the supremum of cell sizes as () ! 1 generically approaches 4(b1 + b2),30 which is less
than twice the corresponding bound of maxf4b1; 4b2g from consulting more senders. There-
fore, the receivers loss from ignoring all senders but the least biased in each direction is not
too large.
The intuition presented above extends to situations where preferences are not too asym-
metric about their peak and the prior is not too far from uniform: cell sizes can be kept
smaller when biases are small and opposite. Moreover, the minimum size of the largest
cell is on the order of maxfb1; b2g whether there are two senders with biases near  b2 and
b1, or more senders with biases in ( 1; b2] [ [b1;1). Therefore, once again, the receiver
can come reasonably close to achieving the minimum expected loss by consulting only two
senders biased in opposite directions and with small biases relative to the available pool of
senders.
7 Discussion
7.1 Alternative Robustness Concept
Online Appendix C studies a weakening of (strong) robustness of   where a strategy prole
close to  , not necessarily   itself, is to be interim -optimal under noise. It is shown
that Theorems 1 and 2 would still hold provided that, in the noisy setting, only common
knowledge of small noise were assumed. (With, instead, only common-prior noise, it is not
known whether Theorems 1a and 2a would remain true under this alternative robustness
concept.)
The formal denitions of close strategy proles and of the alternative robustness concepts
are left to Online Appendix C. Lemma 1 is established in a similar way, but the suboptimality
argument establishing Lemma 2, presented in Section 5, cannot be generalized to nearby
proles in a straightforward way. The proof of Lemma 2 in Online Appendix C relies on a
noise structure where every sender i believes that si =  for sure, but that sj = maxf "; 0g;
thus, players do not share a common prior about the noise. With this noise structure, every
sender i believes that other senders observe a signal (and thus send the message corresponding
to a signal) slightly to the left of si. It is shown inductively, proceeding from left to right,
that, if a cell C were not left-natural, then all senders would send the same messages as they
30If instead b1b2 2 Q, the bound is reduced to 4(b1 +b2 gcd(b1; b2)), where gcd(b1; b2) is the largest number
k such that b1k ;
b2
k 2 Z. For example, if b1 = 0:02 and b2 = 0:03, then for cells to be kept smaller than
4(b1 + b2) = 0:2, their sizes, from left to right, would be "; 0:08 + "; 0:16 + "; 0:04 + "; 0:12 + "; "; ::: The lower
bound on the size of the largest cell is therefore 0:16 = 4(0:02 + 0:03  0:01).
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do in C well past the right endpoint of C, resulting in a strategy prole that is not close to
the original one.
The proofs of Theorems 1b and 2b do not change since the robustness concept has been
relaxed, while the proof of Lemma 3, and thus of Theorem 2a, is modied in a similar way
as the proofs of Lemmata 1 and 2.
7.2 Multidimensional State Space
Extending (strong) robustness to a cheap talk game where  is multidimensional would
not yield implications as strong as with a single-dimensional . Consider a pure-strategy
equilibrium   where, for any  > 0, there exists " > 0 such that at any state , m i ()
is a -best response (given a ) to any vector m i where every component is sent by the
corresponding sender in   at some state in the "-ball around . Then, with small enough
noise, for si = , sender i believes that m i () is a 2-best response.
For example, suppose   R2 and is bounded, n = 2, and curve Ci, for i = 1; 2, is the
boundary between sets wheremi andm0i are sent. Then if C1 and C2 cross (as opposed to being






2) are all sent in   arbitrarily
close to . If, moreover, no message other than mi and m0i is sent near 
, then the property
from the previous paragraph is satised around . As long as C1 and C2 cross whenever they
meet, there are no further restrictions on their shape: they could cross multiple times, one
(or both) of them could be a loop, etc. Therefore, with multidimensional , generalizations
of this papers robustness concept would likely fail to yield an easy-to-characterize set of
equilibria, unlike with   R.
8 Conclusion
This paper has shown that strictly coordination-free equilibria remain interim nearly optimal
for all players for su¢ ciently small local noise in sendersobservation of the state, and any
equilibrium satisfying this property is generically equivalent to a strictly coordination-free
equilibrium. When the small noise is not required to be local, coordination-free equilibria
where all combinations of on-path messages form on-path message vectors are selected. Both
these results hold whether there is common prior about noise, or it is merely commonly known
that noise is small.
Coordination-free equilibria have a similar structure to one-sender equilibria, in that the
size of the rst interval and the identity of the indi¤erent sender at each boundary determine
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play. This property implies that xing sendersbiases and increasing the size of the state
space cannot make the size of the revealed intervals vanishingly small. The amount of
information loss therefore remains nontrivial, unlike in the fully revealing and almost fully
revealing equilibria examined by the existing literature. This papers results may therefore
enable nontrivial comparisons between cheap talk and other ways in which a decision maker
can interact with multiple biased parties that hold relevant information.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose   is strongly robust. Let a denote the receivers best
response to fm j gnj=1 given noise .
Step 1: For any  > 0, 9" > 0 such that for all noise  with size less than ", ja (m) 
a(m)j <  for all m 2 ni=1M i .
By the denition of robustness, we know that for any  > 0, 9" > 0 such that for all
noise  with size less than ", a  is a -best response to fm j gnj=1 under .
Because uR is continuous and strictly concave in a, and  is compact, 9() such that, for
all m 2 ni=1M i and  with size less than ", ja (m)  a(m)j < (), with lim!0 () = 0.
Rewriting  in lieu of () yields the result. 
Step 2:   is complete.
Suppose instead that m = (m1; :::;mn) 2 ni=1M i does not occur in  . Then consider
noise  where:
(i) at some  6= a (m), each sender i independently observes si =  with probability 1 ",
and si = i with probability " for some i where sender is message in   is mi;
(ii) at all other states, each sender observes the true state.
Clearly,  has size at most "D
d
. For any ",  is the only state at which m can occur
in then noisy game, and m can indeed occur at . Thus a(m) = . By step 1, taking
 < ja (m)  j implies that   cannot be robust. 
Step 3: For all m 2 ni=1M i , ( (m)) > 0.
Suppose instead that ( (m)) = 0. Then for any  2  (m) and any " > 0, 90() 2
[   ";  + "] such that for some i 2 N , m i (0()) 6= mi. Let i " () be some such i.
At least two senders have at least two equilibrium messages in  ; assume without loss
of generality that sender 1 is one of them. By step 2, every sender must send each of her
equilibrium messages at a minimum of two states where the message vectors sent by other
senders di¤er. Let 0 be such that m 1 (
0) = m1 and m (
0) 6= m, and let 00 6= a (m) be such
that m (00) = (m001;m2; :::;mn) for some m
00
1 2M 1 . Consider noise  where:
(i) at state 00, sender 1 observes si = 
00 with probability 1 ", and si = 0 with probability
";
(ii) at all states  6= 00 where m () = m, consider a random variable X  U [0; 1]; if




(iii) if neither (i) or (ii) applies, the true state is observed.
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Clearly,  has size at most "D
d
. At all states  6= 00 where m () = m, the receiver
observes m with probability 0; at 00, she observes m with probability " (if m001 6= m1) or 1
(if m001 = m1); and at all other states, she cannot observe m. Because (
 (m)) = 0, upon
observing m, the receiver puts probability 1 on  = 00.31 Picking  < ja (m) 00j completes
the argument. 
Step 4:   has interval structure.
Let S = [I is a proper cell in  I. We proceed by contradiction: suppose (S) < (). Dene
C(m) = (nS) \ f 2  (m) :  < a (m)g and D(m) = (nS) \ f 2  (m) :  > a (m)g.
First, I argue that there exists m 2 ni=1M i such that at least one of C(m) and D(m)
has positive measure. Suppose not. Then (C(m) [D(m)) = 0 for all m. By step 3, only a
countable number of m can be sent, implying both of the following:
(fa (m) s.t. m 2 ni=1M i g) = 0, andX
m2ni=1M i
(C(m) [D(m)) = 0.
Combining the two relations above yields (nS) = 0, which contradicts the hypothesis.
Assume that (C(m)) > 0 for some m = (m1; :::;mn) (the argument for the case
(D(m)) > 0 is symmetric). By denition, for any  2 C(m), we have  =2 S, so for
any " > 0, 90 2 [   ";  + "] such that for some i 2 N , m i (0) 6= mi. Let i () be some
such i, and consider the following noise :
(i) at states  2 C(m), consider a random variable X s U [0; 1]; if the realization of
X is , sender i () observes si = , while if not, sender i () observes si = 
0 for some
0 2 [   ";  + "] where m i (0) 6= mi;
(ii) otherwise, the true state is observed.
Clearly,  has size at most ", and because conditional on observing m under  and
fm j gnj=1, the probability of  2 C(m) is reduced (to zero), we have a(m) > a (m). Thus
taking  < a(m)  a (m) completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 2: We proceed by contradiction. Suppose instead, without loss of
generality, that the right endpoint b 6= 1 of a proper cell C in   where m = (m1; :::;mn)
is sent is not left-natural. By the completeness of   and the denition of "left-natural," it
follows that for any i 2 N and m0i 2M i nfmig, either:
i. ui(a (mi;m i); b) > ui(a (m0i;m i); b); or
31Heuristically, the density that m is observed and that the state is in  (m) is at most D( (m)) = 0,
while the density that m is observed and that the state is 00 is at least d" > 0.
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ii. ui(a (mi;m i); b) = ui(a (m0i;m i); b) and a
 (mi;m i)  a (m0i;m i).
Case ii can be ruled out: if ui(a (mi;m i); b) = ui(a (m0i;m i); b), then Assumption
A implies a (mi;m i) 6= a (m0i;m i). Furthermore, a (mi;m i) > a (m0i;m i) would, by
single-crossing, contradict mi being a best response to m i immediately to the left of b.
Thus we have ui(a (mi;m i); b) > ui(a (m0i;m i); b).
There can be only nitely many actions a (m00i ;m i) for m
00
i 2 M i . If not, then at least
two such actions, say a < a0, are within  of each other, which implies that sender i either
strictly prefers a0 whenever   a (if bi(:) > 0), or strictly prefers a whenever   a0 (if
bi(:) < 0). Given completeness, this contradicts the receiver always playing a best response.
Combining the observations from the two previous paragraphs, it follows that there exists
 > 0 such that, at  = b, sender is unique 2-best response to m i is mi. Therefore, given
si 2 [b; b + ") for small enough " and any noise  such that sender i believes that, with
su¢ ciently high probability, all other senderssignals are in cell C, sender is unique -best
response to m i is mi. Therefore, if   is strongly robust, then every sender must send mi
both at and immediately to the right of b. This contradicts b being the right endpoint of
C. 
Proof of Theorem 1b: Fix  > 0.
Senders play a -best response
After signal si, sender i places probability at least 1   n" on all senderssignals being
in [si   2"; si + 2"]. Because utilities are continuous and bounded (the latter from Lipschitz
continuity and  being bounded), this means that, for " small enough, all senders are playing
-best responses more than 2" away from cell endpoints.
By the same token, close to a boundary between cells where (mi;m i) and (m0i;m i)
are sent, both mi and m0i are -best responses because player i places probability near 1 on
others sending m i.
Close to a boundary between cells where (mi;mj;m ij) and (mi;m0j;m ij) are sent, since
mi is a -best response to both (mj;m ij) and (m0j;m ij), the same argument applies.
The receiver plays a -best response
Let S" = f 2  : m (0) = m () for all 0 2 [   ";  + "]g be the set of states more
than " away from a cell endpoint. Proposition 1 implies that for any  > 0, 9"() > 0 such
that (S"()) > 1  . So for any m 2 ni=1M i , under any noise less than "():
 when  2 S"() \  (m), the receiver sees m with probability at least 1  n"();
 when  2 S"()n (m), the receiver sees m with probability at most "().
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Let ( (m))  m > 0. Upon seeing m, the receiver puts probability at least
(1  n"())(m   )d
(1  n"())(m   )d+ D + "()D
on the state being in  (m). As  ! 0, the above quantity still converges to 1. It follows
that as "()! 0, the receivers optimal action converges to a (m).
Because there are nitely many cells, minm:m>0 m exists (and is positive). It follows
that for any  > 0, it is possible to pick  > 0 such that under any noise less than "(),
playing a (m) is a -best response for the receiver to allm sent in equilibrium in the noiseless
game. 
Proof of Lemma 3: Like in the proof of Theorem 1a, we study the nontrivial case
jfi 2 N : jM i j  2gj  2.
Step 1: Identical to step 1 in the proof of Lemma 1 for on-path m, and by the denition
of small perturbations for o¤-path m.
Step 2: For any m 2 ni=1M i , if  (m) contains two or more elements, then ( (m)) >
0.
Since  (m) contains at least two elements, there exists  2  (m)nfa (m)g.
Suppose instead that ( (m)) = 0. Then for any " > 0 and any  where m () = m,
90() 2 [   ";  + "] such that for some i 2 N , m i (0()) 6= mi. Let i " () be any such i,
and consider the following noise :
(i) at states  2  (m)nfg, consider a random variable X s U [0; 1]; if the realization
of X is , sender i " () observes si = , while if not, sender i
 
" () observes si = 
0 for some
0 2 [   ";  + "] where m i (0) 6= mi;32
(ii) for all other senders, and for i " () at all other states, the true state is observed.
Clearly,  has size at most ", and a(m) =  6= a (m).33 By step 1, taking  <
j   a (m)j completes the proof. 
Step 3: The set of fully revealed states in   has measure zero.
Consider  > 0 from point 2 of the denition of robustness. Pick  < , and let " > 0 be
the corresponding bound on noise from point 1 of the denition of robustness.
32It is not necessary for this proof to allow the possibility that sender i " () observes si = . However, doing
so ensures that the proof remains consistent with an alternative denition of small local noise additionally
requiring the sender to believe, after any signal, that the state is nearby.
33Heuristically, the density that m is observed and that the state is in  (m) is at most D( (m)) = 0,
while the density that m is observed and that the state is  is at least d > 0.
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Let S denote the set of fully revealed states, and suppose instead that it has positive
measure. Then there exists an interval I of size " such that (S \ I) > 0. Within S \ I, a
continuum of equilibriummessage vectors is sent, so we may assume without loss of generality
that sender 1 has a continuum of equilibrium messages within S \ I; let T denote this set of
messages.
Suppose  2 S \ I, and let m () = (m1;m2; :::;mn). Consider m0 = (m01;m2; :::;mn)
where m01 2 T . I now argue that m0 must be sent at some state in  . Suppose instead that
 (m0) = ?. Then consider the following noise :
(i) when the state is , sender 1 observes with equal probability  and 0 2 S \ I where
m 1 (
0) = m01, while all other senders observe ;
(ii) at all other states, everyone observes the true state.
Clearly,  has size at most ". By the hypothesis that  (m0) = ?, we have a(m0) = :
under  and fm j gnj=1, m0 can only arise if the state is .
By step 1, ja (m0) j < ; since  < , this implies  2 (a (m0) ; a (m0)+). It follows
that point 2 in the denition of robustness is violated: there exists a 2 [a (m0) ; a (m0)+]
such that if the receivers actions following m0 were a, then sender 1 would have a protable
deviation at  (specically, take a slightly larger (smaller) than  if sender 1 is biased to the
right (left)).
Thus m0 must be sent at some state in  . Because T contains a continuum of messages,
there is a continuum of such m0. By step 2, each must be sent either at only one state or
on a set of positive measure. Because the number of actions such m0 can induce is nite
(as they must be separated by at least ), only nitely many can be sent at only one state.
Moreover, only countably many can be sent on a set of positive measure, which contradicts
the continuum of m0. 
Step 4:   has interval structure.
Dene S, C(m) and D(m) as in the proof of Lemma 1. We proceed by contradiction:
suppose (S) < ().
Once again, there exists m 2 ni=1M i such that at least one of C(m) and D(m) has
positive measure. Suppose not. Then (C(m) [ D(m)) = 0 for all m. By step 2, only a
countable number of m can be sent at two or more states, implying both of the following:
(fa (m) s.t. m is sent at two or more statesg) = 0, andX
m is sent at two or more states
(C(m) [D(m)) = 0.
Combining the two relations above with step 3 yields (nS) = 0, which contradicts the
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hypothesis.
The remainder of this step is identical to the remainder of step 4 in the proof of Lemma
1. 
The remainder of the proof shows that   is natural by following the proof of Lemma
2. The same argument shows that among messages m0i 2 M i such that (m0i;m i) occurs
on path in  , mi is the unique approximate best response to m i at  = b. Furthermore,
messages m0i 2 M i such that (m0i;m i) is o¤-path in   cannot be nearly optimal by point
2 of the denition of robustness (which also implies point 3 of the denition of strictly
coordination-free equilibrium). Thus, the last paragraph of the proof of Lemma 2 applies
here. 
Proof of Theorem 2b: By Proposition 1, the number of distinct messages in a
coordination-free equilibrium is nite. Combined with point 3 in the denition of strictly
coordination-free equilibria, this ensures that point 2 in the denition of robustness is satis-
ed.
The rest of this proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1b. The argument showing that
senders play a -best response carries through. For the receivers best response, there are
three cases to consider:
a) To message vectors m sent in a cell that is not f0g or f1g
The argument from the proof of Theorem 1b is valid (but can be simplied since the
probabilities are 1 and 0 instead of 1  n"() and "()).
b) To message vectors m not sent at any state in   in the noiseless game
If senders play according to a coordination-free  , combining message vectors from ad-
jacent cells will not yield an out-of-equilibrium message vector because only one senders
message changes at each boundary. Thus, m must combine messages from non-adjacent
cells, which are separated by more than " for " small enough. If noise is less than ", then m
must be unexpected to the receiver, who is therefore not required to play a -best response
after m.
c) To a message vector m sent in cell f0g (analogous argument for f1g)
As long as " is less than the size of any proper cell in  , the receiver must believe that
 2 [0; "] upon observing m if m is on-path according to the receivers beliefs about the noise
(if not, then as in case b, the receiver is not required to play a -best response). Thus, for "
su¢ ciently small, a(m) = 0 is a -best response. 
Proof of Proposition 2a: Because ([I is a proper cell in  I) = () and m is sent on a
set with positive measure, m must be sent in at least one proper cell. Suppose that  (m) is
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not connected, and assume without loss of generality that m () = m (0) = m for some  in
a proper cell and 0 >  outside that cell. Let b be the right endpoint of the cell where  lies.
Because   is natural, for some sender i, we have ui(a (mi;m i); b) = ui(a (m0i;m i); b)
and a (mi;m i) < a (m0i;m i), with m
0
i 2 M i . But by single-crossing, this implies that at
0 > b, ui(a (mi;m i); 
0) < ui(a (m0i;m i); 
0), so sender i has a protable deviation at 0.

Proof of Proposition 2b: Let  2 , and consider a proper cell C with left endpoint
L 2 (;  + ], where message vector m is sent. By Proposition 2a, m is sent only in
cell C. Because L must be right-natural for some sender i, we must have a (m) > L +
bi(L) > a
 (m0) for some m0 that is on-path and di¤ers from m in component i only. (Thus
L + bi(L) =2 f0; 1g, which implies jbi(L)j   > 0.) Cell C can be of two types:
i. If bi(:) > 0, we must have a (m) > L + bi(L)  L + , which implies that cell C has
size greater than . There is at most one such cell for a given .
ii. If bi(:) < 0, we must have a (m0) < L + bi(L)  L    < . Therefore, if there are
k < 1 on-path actions in [0; ], then at most k actions can be a (m0). By the denition
of "right-natural," each of them corresponds to at most n values of L. Thus, there are at
most nk such cells for a given .
If there are k cells with a left endpoint in [0; ], there are at most k on-path actions in
[0; ]. By the above argument, there are then at most nk proper cells with a left endpoint
in (; + ]. Because ([I is a proper cell in  I) = (), every non-proper cell in (; + ] must
be the endpoint of a proper cell, so there are at most 2nk cells total whose left endpoint is
in (; + ]. By induction, if a nite upper bound for the number of on-path actions in [0; ]
exists for some  > 0, then a nite upper bound for the overall number of cells exists as well.
To complete the proof, note that, by cases i and ii above, any proper cell whose left
endpoint is not 0 must induce an action greater than  (for case ii, a (m) > L > a (m0)+).
There are therefore at most three inducible actions in [0; ]: the rst proper cells action and
endpoints. 
Proof of Proposition 4b: The proof of Proposition 4a follows this proof because it
uses Proposition 4b.
Dene "structure" as in the main text. Because the number of structures is nite, and
the intersection of nitely many open and dense sets is itself open and dense, it is appropriate
to consider each structure separately. That is, it su¢ ces to show that, xing a natural equi-
librium   that is not equivalent to a coordination-free equilibrium, the set P   of primitives
such that no natural equilibrium has the structure of   contains an open and dense set. To
avoid clutter, the superscript   is suppressed in the remainder of the proof.
36
Label the sender indi¤erence conditions (i.e. equalities of sender utility) imposed by
the right-structure of   as m = 1; :::; K, and label the additional ones imposed by the left-
structure as m = K+1; :::;M . Each of the latter conditions is "additional" in the sense that
the right-structure condition corresponding to the same boundary must refer to di¤erent
actions. As argued in the main text, if   is not equivalent to a coordination-free equilibrium,
then M  K + 1.
Let dU;fm (2; 4; :::; 2K) be the magnitude of the di¤erence between the two sides of condi-
tion m when the preference prole is (U; f), the even s (cell boundaries) are 2; 4; :::; 2K ,
and the odd s satisfy 2k+1 = arg maxa
R 2k+2
2k
uR(a; )f()d for k = 0; :::; K. There-
fore, if the receiver plays a best response, then condition m is satised with cell bound-
aries 2; 4; :::; 2K if and only if dU;fm (2; 4; :::; 2K) = 0. Consider the function d(U; f) =
min024:::2K1 maxm d
U;f
m (2; 4; :::; 2K), which is well-dened since d
U;f
m is continuous
in (2; 4; :::; 2K) and f(2; 4; :::; 2K) 2 RK : 0  2  :::  2K  1g is compact. Let
P 0 = f(U; f) : d(U; f) > 0g. By denition, P 0  P : if d(U; f) > 0, then there is no
cell boundary sequence 2; 4; :::; 2K such that all M conditions are satised. Therefore, it
su¢ ces to show that P 0 is open and dense.
P 0 is open: Since dU;fm is continuous in (U; f), d is also continuous in (U; f). Therefore,
P 0 must be open.
P 0 is dense: Let tU;f (2) denote the right endpoint of the rightmost cell implied by the
right-structure given 2 when the primitives are (U; f); it is well-dened whenever  1 by
the argument in the main text. Let T (U; f) = f2 2 [0; 1] : tU;f (2) = 1g, U denote the






i (a; ) = ui(a; ) for  2 (0; 1] and a;  2 [0; 1 ],
and f() = f() for  2 (0; 1] and  2 [0; 1

].
Note that for any 2 such that tU;f (2)  1, we have tU;f(2) = 1tU;f (2). Therefore,
T (U; f) = f2 2 [0; 1] : tU;f (2) = g. By the bounds on f and the Lipschitz continuity
of U , tU;f (:) is Lipschitz continuous where tU;f (2)  1. It follows that the graph of tU;f (:)
has nite length, which implies that T (U; f) cannot be innite on a positive measure of
. Therefore, there exist  arbitrarily close to 1 such that T (U; f) is nite.
By construction, (U; f) 2 P 0 when there exists no 2 2 T (U; f) such that the M   K
equalities corresponding to conditions m  K + 1 are all satised. Focus on condition
K + 1, let b be the corresponding boundary, and let j be the sender whose indi¤erence
is required by this condition. Given  such that T (U; f) is nite, in order for condition
K + 1 to be satised, one of a nite number (one for each 2 2 T (U; f)) of equalities of
form uj(a; b) = uj(a0; b) must hold. Therefore, there exist arbitrarily small perturbations
of uj around a nite number of pairs (a; b) such that these equalities do not hold. As
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long as, for all such pairs (a; b), uj(a; b) does not appear in the nitely many equalities
corresponding to conditions 1; :::; K for 2 2 T (U; f), these perturbations do not impact
the right-structure for any 2 2 T (U; f). This is generically the case: for a given 2, no
other condition can involve uj(a; b) (or else it would be redundant with condition K + 1),
so perturbing uj(a; b) can only impact the right-structure for a di¤erent 
0
2 2 T (U; f) if
a boundary in the right-structure corresponding to 02 happens to fall on b. Therefore, for
any (U; f), there exists an arbitrarily close (U 0; f) 2 P 0, as desired. 
Proof of Proposition 4a: Since every message vector in ni=1M i is sent on a set of
positive measure, by Proposition 2a,  (m) is a non-trivial interval for all m 2 ni=1M i .
Then, if   were not coordination-free, it would also not be equivalent to a coordination-free
equilibrium. By Proposition 4b,   would not natural, which violates the hypothesis. 
Proof of Proposition 5: Consider a coordination-free equilibrium   with K + 1 cells,
labeled 0; 1; :::; K, and let i(k) be the sender whose message changes between cell k   1 and
cell k, for k = 1; :::; K. Letting ck be the size of cell k, we have ck = ck 1 +4bi(k). To see this,
suppose that the boundary between cells k 1 and k is b. Then the actions corresponding to
these cells are b  ck 12 and b + ck2 , respectively. Thus ui(k)(b  ck 12 ; b) = ui(k)(b + ck2 ; b),





  bi(k), or ck = ck 1 + 4bi(k), as desired. It follows that













Suppose bi(k) > b for some k 2 f1; :::; Kg, and let bj = b. Consider alternative candidate
play  0 with K + 1 cells labeled in the same way, where the sender whose message changes
between cell k   1 and cell k is i0(k) =
(
i(k) if k 6= k
j if k = k
. Let c0k be the size of cell k. Note






= c0  0. Furthermore, it
must be that c0k > ck for all k = 0; :::; k
   1, and c0k < ck for all k = k; :::; K. Thus, the













k, which is strictly convex, the expected
loss is strictly smaller under  0 than under  .
Iterating this argument implies that there exists a candidate play   with K+1 cells and
where sender j is the only non-babbling sender, and that the receiver is strictly better o¤
under   than under  . Furthermore, because only one sender has more than one equilibrium
message in  , we need not worry about o¤-path play and know that   is part of an
equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 6a: First, note that by Proposition 7 (see Online Appendix A),
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as (l) becomes large and for a xed maximum block size, every candidate play is part
of a coordination-free equilibrium. This proof considers equilibria where no cell has size
above 4(b1 + b2), which implies a bound on block size. Therefore, o¤-path play need not be
considered.
By the rst paragraph of the proof of Proposition 5, going from left to right, the size of
cells either increases by 4b1 or decreases by 4b2 at each boundary.
Consider a coordination-free equilibrium   that has no cell with size above 4(b1 + b2).
If a cell in   has size in (0; 4b2], then the indi¤erent sender at its right endpoint must be
sender 1: the next cell cannot be smaller by 4b2. If a cell in   has size greater than 4b2,
then the indi¤erent sender at the right endpoint must be sender 2: by assumption, the next
cell cannot be bigger by 4b1. Thus, in any such  , the size of the leftmost cell uniquely
determines the sizes of all cells: if a cell size is above 4b2, the next cell is smaller by 4b2;
otherwise, it is bigger by 4b1.
It follows that, labeling cells sequentially with integers, and letting the size of cell 0 be
4c(b1 + b2), the size of cell k is 4(b1 + b2)hk b1b1+b2 + ci, where hxi denotes the fractional part of
x if x =2 Z, and 1 if x 2 Z. Since b1
b2
=2 Q, we have b1
b1+b2
=2 Q, and it follows that the numbers
in the sequence hk b1
b1+b2
+ ciKk=0  fxkgKk=0 are uniformly distributed over (0; 1] as K ! 1,
i.e. for each interval I  (0; 1], limK!1 1K+1 jfk : xk 2 I; 0  k  Kgj = (I) (Hardy and
Wright, 1960, Theorem 445).
It remains to be shown that if   maximizes the number of cells, then none of its cells has
size exceeding 4(b1 + b2). Suppose a coordination-free equilibrium   has K + 1 cells, whose
sizes are denoted s0; :::; sK , with maxfskgKk=0 > 4(b1 + b2). Then another coordination-free
equilibrium  0 with at least K + 2 cells, whose sizes are denoted s00; :::, can be built using
the following steps:
i. Let s00 = 4(b1 + b2)h s04(b1+b2)i, and extrapolate additional cells so that none has size
exceeding 4(b1 + b2) in the unique way described in paragraph 3 of this proof. This implies
that s0k = 4(b1 + b2)h sk4(b1+b2)i for all k = 0; :::; K. By assumption, the right endpoint of cell
K in  0 occurs at least 4(b1 + b2) to the left of the right endpoint of . Therefore, at least
one more cell will t in the remaining space.
ii. Increase the sizes of the cells in  0 so that they ll . 
Proof of Proposition 6b: By the rst paragraph of the proof of Proposition 5, xing
the indi¤erent sender at each boundary in the uniform-quadratic case, the size of every cell is
strictly monotonic in the size of the leftmost cell. Thus, all boundaries are strictly monotonic
in the leftmost inducible action. It follows that each structure (as dened in Section 5.4)
admits a unique candidate play. Because the number of structures is nite, the number of
coordination-free equilibria is nite, so uRl is well-dened.
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Consider the construction of  0 from   in the nal part of the proof of Proposition 6a.
Step (i) enhances the receivers average welfare (for the area covered by cells), as cells with
sizes above 4(b1 + b2) are replaced by cells with sizes at or below 4(b1 + b2), while cells with
sizes at or below 4(b1+b2) retain their sizes. Step (ii) decreases the receivers average welfare.
However, because the total amount by which cells in  0 must be expanded is bounded above
by 4(b1+b2), the e¤ect on the size of each cell, and thus on receivers average welfare, vanishes
as l !1. Therefore, letting vRl denote the receivers maximum expected utility, when the


























where the integrand  x3
12
in the numerator is the contribution of a cell of size x to the
expected loss when () = 1, the denominator normalizes for the size of , and the limit
distribution of cell sizes is U [0; 4(b1 + b2)] by Proposition 6a. 
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Online Appendix A: Relation between Candidate Play
and Equilibrium Play in Coordination-Free Equilibrium
First, consider the following example illustrating two ways in which candidate play can fail
to be equilibrium play.
Example 6: Consider candidate play with two senders whose biases satisfy b1(:) < 0
and b2(:) > 0, and three cells where the equilibrium message vectors are, from left to right,
(L;L), (H;L) and (H;H) (so that (L;H) is out-of-equilibrium). It is easy to think of two
cases where any location of a (L;H) induces a deviation:
a) Sender 1 has a small leftward bias while sender 2 has a large rightward bias, such that
the middle interval (H;L) is very small, and the rightmost interval (H;H) is very big (see
Figure A.1). Then choosing a (L;H) < a (H;H) induces sender 1 to deviate from H to
L near the left end of the (H;H) interval, choosing a (L;H) > a (H;H) induces sender 1
to deviate near the right end of the (H;H) interval, while choosing a (L;H) = a (H;H)
induces sender 2 to deviate from L to H near the right end of the (L;L) interval.
Figure A.1: Case a
b) Sender 2 dislikes a (L;L) so much that, at the boundary 1 between (L;L) and (H;L),
u2(a; 1) > u2(a
 (L;L); 1) for all a > 1. Similarly, sender 1 dislikes a (H;H) so much
that u1(a; 2) > u1(a (H;H); 2) for all a < 2. Since a (H;H) > a (L;L), it is impossible
for a (L;H) to be simultaneously less than a (L;L) and greater than a (H;H), so once
again a deviation is always desired.
The following derives a condition under which candidate play is guaranteed to constitute
equilibrium play.
Let Ui() = fu : 9a1 6= a2 2  s.t. ui(a1; ) = ui(a2; ) = ug be the set of utilities
achieved for sender i at state  by two distinct actions. By the single-peakedness of ui, these
actions must be on opposite sides of sender is ideal action + bi(). Let a i (u; ) < a
+
i (u; )








measure of how asymmetric sender is utility function can get around its peak  + bi(): if
ui is perfectly symmetric, as in the quadratic case, then Ai = 1, and the more asymmetric
it is, the higher Ai.
2
Given candidate play, call an i-block a maximal interval of states where each sender other
than i sends a single message. Clearly, every block is a union of cells, and an i-block with
more than one cell is formed when sender is message changes at a boundary. For example,
with two senders and three cells numbered 1, 2 and 3 from left to right, if the message




2) in cells 1, 2 and 3 respectively, then there are two
1-blocks (cell 1; cells 2 and 3) and two 2-blocks (cells 1 and 2; cell 3). Note that a given
i-block and a given j-block can overlap for at most one cell because each boundary can be
crossed by only one block.
Proposition 7: Given candidate play  , let k i denote the size of the largest i-block, and
let x i = (1+Ai)(k
 
i +max2 jbi()j) for each i whose message changes at some boundary. If
the sum of the two largest x i is less than () = 1, then there exists a strictly coordination-
free equilibrium where:
 play is described by  ; and
 each player is messages can be ordered so that mi() is non-decreasing.
Proof of Proposition 7: Given candidate play  , assign messages as follows: in the
leftmost cell, all senders send 1, and at every boundary where a senders message changes,
that senders message increases by 1. This message assignment rules out the following
scenario: in a cell where the assigned message vector is m = (m1; :::;mn), a sender (without
loss of generality, sender 1) wants to deviate to m01, and m
0 = (m01;m2; :::;mn) occurs on the
equilibrium path. To see this, assume without loss of generality that a (m0) > a (m). Then
it must be that in the cell immediately to the right of the one where m is sent, the message
vector is m00 = (m001;m2; :::;mn) for some m
00




Since within the cell where m is sent, sender 1 prefers a (m) to a (m00), by single-crossing,
she also prefers a (m) to a (m0) and cannot desire a deviation.
Therefore, the only concern is to place the receivers actions after o¤-path message vectors
without inducing a deviation. For any o¤-path message vector m, there are at most two
senders whose deviation can induce m. To see this, normalize messages by subtracting a
constant to each senders messages such that m = (0; :::; 0). If a sender i can induce m by
deviating from a negative message when all others send 0, then when i sends 0, all other
sendersmessages must be nonnegative. Thus only one other sender can deviate to m, and
must do so from a positive message. The symmetric argument holds as well, so at most one
sender can deviate to m from a positive message, and at most one sender can deviate to m
from a negative message.
3
Now suppose sender i can deviate to induce m. The set of states from which she can
do this must constitute an i-block, which has size at most k i . Denote the left and right
endpoints of the i-block by L and R, the leftmost and rightmost inducible actions within
the i-block by aL and aR, and assume without loss of generality that bi(:) > 0. Then a
deviation by i will not be induced if either:
- a(m) > R + max2 jbi()j+ Ai(R + max2 jbi()j   aR); or
- a(m) < minfaL; L + min2 jbi()j   Ai(aL   (L + min2 jbi()j))g.
Therefore, letting Di = max2 jbi()j   min2 jbi()j, the maximum range where a
deviation can be induced is:
maxf(Ai + 1) max
2
jbi()j+ Ai(R   aR) + (R   aL); (Ai + 1)(k i +Di)  Ai(aR   aL)g




jbi()j) = x i ,
where the inequality follows from R aR; R aL < k i , Di < max2 jbi()j, and aR aL  0.
If the ranges for the two potential deviators do not cover , then it is possible to place
a (m) without inducing a deviation. The result follows. 
The proof of Proposition 7 shows that if messages are assigned as stated, then no deviation
to an on-path message vector is ever desired, and at most two senders, each from one block,
can deviate to an out-of-equilibriummessage vector. An i-block of size k is associated with an
interval of size at most (1+Ai)(k+max2 jbi()j) where placing an out-of-equilibrium action
would cause a deviation by sender i. Therefore, the total area where an out-of-equilibrium
vector cannot be placed is at most the sum of the two largest x i .
In the uniform-quadratic specication, as shown in the rst paragraph of the proof of
Proposition 5, cell size changes by 4bi (from left to right) at a boundary where sender is
message changes. Thus, if bi > 0, cells grow from left to right, and vice versa. It follows
that:
- cells can be kept small if, in each direction, there is a sender with a small bias; and
- large i-blocks must contain large cells (relative to jbij) at one end.
Thus, the most informative candidate play must only have small i-blocks if, in each
direction, there is a sender with a small bias. In this situation, any su¢ ciently informative




i + jbij), for all i 2
N . Proposition 7 implies that such   corresponds to play in a strictly coordination-free
equilibrium where messages are assigned so that each is used on a connected set of states.
As a result, for each i 2 N , there exists an order on M i such that sender is strategy is
4
monotonic.1
A similar reasoning can be applied whenever the receivers preferred action in each cell
is not far from its center2, and Ai is close to 1 for each sender. Therefore, in such settings,
Proposition 7 (combined with Theorem 2 motivating strictly coordination-free equilibria)
provides a justication for focusing on monotonic strategies when studying the most infor-
mative equilibria, if a sender with small bias is available in each direction.
Online Appendix B: Analysis Without Assumption A
This section dispenses with Assumption A, and allows for noise where players have hetero-
geneous prior, as long as there is common knowledge that noise is small. Then, if there
is no state  and pair of actions between which two senders are both indi¤erent at ,3 the
implications of Theorems 1 and 2 about the function a  m  mapping state to action in a
(strongly) robust equilibrium   still hold: it must generically correspond to candidate play
computed by forward solution (and, for strong robustness, be complete).
Denition: Given a pure-strategy prole  , let a supercell in   be a maximal interval
of states throughout which a  m  remains constant.
Denition: A proper supercell in   is natural* if, denoting its endpoints as 1 < 2 and
its induced action as a:
 (right-natural*) whenever 1 6= 0, 90 such that a (m (0)) = a and that, for some









0)); 1) = ui(a; 1) and a (m0i;m
 
 i(
0)) < a; and
 (left-natural*) whenever 2 6= 1, 900 such that a (m (00)) = a and that, for some
1Given a strictly coordination-free equilibrium  , it is not always possible to obtain a monotonic strictly
coordination-free equilibrium through a reassignment of messages. Consider Example 3, and change m1 in
(0:51; 1] to z 6= x; y so that sender 1s strategy becomes monotonic. Message vector (x; y) is now out-of-
equilibrium. If a (x; y) is placed anywhere other than 0:285 and 0:755, then sender 1 would have a protable
deviation to x at some  2 (0:06; 1]. But placing a (x; y) at 0:285 or 0:755 violates point 3 of the denition
of strictly coordination-free equilibrium.
2This happens whenever F is not too far from being uniform and uR is not too asymmetric.
3This assumption holds for generic biases (i.e. whenever no two biases are exactly equal) within the class
of quadratic loss preferences from Section 3.
5













Denition: An equilibrium is natural* if its strategy prole has interval structure, and
all of its proper supercells are natural*.
The denition of natural* proper supercell implies that, in  , m (0) can be sent only at
and to the right of 1. Since a (m (
0)) = a, we have 1  a and, by a similar argument,
a  2. It follows that there is at most one proper supercell inducing a. As a result, a
left-structure and a right-structure can be dened for a natural* equilibrium   in the same
way as for natural equilibria, but using supercells rather than cells. The argument in the
proof of Proposition 4(b) carries through: if a  m  does not correspond to candidate play,
then the conditions imposed by the structures would be too numerous and thus, generically,
would not be satised. In this context, that argument implies the following result:
Proposition 4*: Generically, if   is natural*, then the endpoints and induced action
for all proper supercells in   can be computed by forward solution.
The results corresponding to Theorems 1 and 2 in the main text are as follows.
Theorem 1*: Suppose that whenever ui(a; ) = ui(a0; ), we have uj(a; ) 6= uj(a0; )
for all j 6= i ("no simultaneous indi¤erence," henceforth abbreviated NSI). Then:
(a) Generically, if   is strongly robust, then it is complete and corresponds to a forward
solution (i.e. it has interval structure, and the endpoints and induced action for all proper
supercells in   can be computed by forward solution.).
(b) If   is coordination-free and complete and has nitely many cells, and no cell in   is
f0g or f1g, then it is strongly robust.
Theorem 2*: Assume NSI. Then:
(a) Generically, if   is robust, then it corresponds to a forward solution.
(b) If   is strictly coordination-free and has nitely many cells, then it is robust.
The proofs of Theorems 1(b) and 2(b) remain valid for Theorems 1*(b) and 2*(b).
These arguments rely on the number of cells being nite, which needs to be assumed here:
while coordination-freeness still guarantees a nite number of supercells, within a given





j;m ij), then there could be a supercell where the message vec-
tor sent switches innitely many times between (mi;mj;m ij), (m0i;mj;m ij) and (mi;m
0
j;m ij).
This can pose problems if a (mi;mj;m ij) 6= a (m0i;m0j;m ij).)
By Proposition 4*, to prove Theorem 1*(a), it su¢ ces to show the following lemmata.
Lemma 1*: If   is strongly robust, then it is complete, has interval structure, and
fm : m () = m for some  2 g is nite.
Lemma 2*: If   is strongly robust and NSI holds, then   is natural*.
Proof of Lemma 1*: The proof of Lemma 1, which shows ( (m)) > 0 for all m 2
ni=1M i and interval structure, carries over.
Fix any  2 (0; 1
4
), and suppose instead that fm : m () = m for some  2 g is
innite. Then, for any " > 0, 9m0 such that ( (m0)) 2 (0; "). Fix such m0, and let
0 = 
 (m0) and i = f 2 n0 : m i () = m0i g. Let 0  n0 be a nontrivial set of
states such that the receivers best response conditional on  2 0, denoted a0, is outside
(a (m0) 2; a (m0)+2). (0 exists for " su¢ ciently small.) Denote the ex ante probability
that  2 S by F (S).
Since (0) < ", for any  2 0, 90() 2 (   ";  + ") such that for some i 2 N ,
m i () 6= m i (0()). Let i " () be some such i.
Consider noise  where:
(i) at states  2 0, for each i 2 N , with probability "minf 1
n
; F (i)
F (0)g, sender i observes
si 2 i according to density proportional to the prior, and with the remaining probability,
si = ; observations are independent across senders;
(ii) at states  2 0, consider a random variable X distributed according to a continuous
density g, where g(0) > 0; if the realization of X is 0, sender i " () observes si = , while if
not, sender i " () observes si = 0();
(iii) if neither (i) or (ii) applies, the true state is observed.
It is straightforward to check that, by construction,  has size at most ". With ex ante
probability F (0)"n
Qn
j=1 minf 1n ; F (j)F (0) g, the receiver observes m0 and the state is in 0; with
ex ante probability 0, the receiver observesm0 and the state is in 0; and with the remainder
probability, the receiver does not observe m0. Therefore, for " su¢ ciently small, a(m0) = a0
is more than  away from a (m0). By step 1 of the proof of Lemma 1,   is then not strongly
robust. 
Proof of Lemma 2*: Like for Lemma 2, we proceed by contradiction. Suppose instead,
without loss of generality, that a proper supercell C in   with right endpoint b is not left-
natural*. Consider the following classes of noise:
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Noise (";N1; :::; Nn; )
- Each sender i believes that sj = maxf  "; 0g for j 2 Ni  Nnfig, and that sj =  for
j =2 Ni.
- The receiver believes that all senders observe the true state.
- These beliefs are common knowledge.
Noise (";N1; :::; Nn;+)
- Each sender i believes that sj = minf + "; 1g for j 2 Ni  Nnfig, and that sj =  for
j =2 Ni.
- The receiver believes that all senders observe the true state.
- These beliefs are common knowledge.
Case A: b 2 C
Fix an arbitrary " > 0, and denote m (b) = m and m (b + ") = m". Since b 2 C, we
have a (m) = a.
Since   is strongly robust, for any  > 0, there exists " su¢ ciently small so that sender




 i); b)  ui(a (m"i ;m i); b)  ,
where mj = mj if j =2 Ni and mj = m"j if j 2 Ni. Moreover, sender is -optimality at




 i); b + ")  ui(a (mi;m i); b + ")  .




 i); b)! ui(a (mi;m i); b) as "! 0. (1)








Fix " > 0 such that a (m") 6= a and (2) hold; such " must exist, or else b would not be
an endpoint of C.
Observation 1:
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(i) Suppose (2) holds, mi 6= m"i , mj 6= m"j, and a (mi;mj;m ij) = a for some m ij 2
k 6=i;jfmk;m"kg. Then either a (m"i ;mj;m ij) = a (mi;m"j ;m ij) = a (m"i ;m"j ;m ij) 6= a,
or at least one of these three actions is equal to a.
(ii) If NSI additionally holds, then we have a (m"i ;mj;m








Proof of Observation 1: (i) Suppose a (m"i ;mj;m








 ij); b) implies b + bi(b) 2 (a (mi;mj;m ij); a (m"i ;mj;m ij)). We also
have uj(a (m"i ;mj;m
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 ij) would be to the













 ij) 2 (a; a (m"i ;mj;m ij)), so that b+bj(b) 2 (a (m"i ;m"j ;m ij); a (m"i ;mj;m ij)).
It follows that either a (mi;m"j ;m










ter is ruled out since sender i cannot be simultaneously indi¤erent between a and a (m"i ;mj;m

 ij),

















 ij) < a, so that b + bj(b) 2 (a (m"i ;m"j ;m ij); a (m"i ;mj;m ij)). It










 ij) 6= a is not possible
since sender i cannot be simultaneously indi¤erent between a and a (m"i ;mj;m

 ij), as well




















 ij). Since sender i must be simultaneously indif-
ferent between a and a (m"i ;mj;m
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A symmetric argument applies if a (m"i ;mj;m

 ij) < a.
(ii) By NSI, i and j cannot be indi¤erent between a (mi;mj;m ij) = a and the same















 ij) 6= a, by part (i), we have a (m"i ;m"j ;m ij) = a. But
then, at b, i is indi¤erent between a (mi;mj;m ij) = a and a
 (m"i ;mj;m

 ij), while j is




 ij) = a and a
 (m"i ;mj;m

 ij). This again cannot occur by
NSI. 
Therefore, if mi 6= m"i , mj 6= m"j, and a (mi;mj;m ij) = a, then it is possible to change
a component of (mi;mj;m ij) from its value in m to its value in m
" without changing the
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induced action. Doing so and iterating the process yields a (mi;m" i) = a for some i 2 N .
Substituting this into (2) with m i = m
"
 i gives
ui(a; b) = ui(a
 (m"); b). (3)
Moreover, by is optimality at b + " in the noiseless game and single-crossing, we cannot
have a > a (m"). It follows that a < a (m"), which, together with (3), implies that b is
left-natural* after all.
Case B: b =2 C
Now denote m (b) = m0 and m (b   ") = m". Since b =2 C, we have a (m0) 6= a.
Since   is strongly robust, for any  > 0, there exists " su¢ ciently small so that sender




 i); b)  ui(a (m"i ;m i); b)  ,
where mj = m
0
j if j =2 Ni and mj = m"j if j 2 Ni. Moreover, sender is -optimality at




 i); b   ")  ui(a (m0i;m i); b   ")  .








Fix " > 0 such that (4) holds, and note that a (m") = a 6= a (m0). The remainder of the
proof is symmetric to the argument in Case A. 
Similarly, by Proposition 4*, to prove Theorem 2*(a), it su¢ ces to prove the following
Lemma.
Lemma 3*: If   is robust and NSI holds, then   is natural*.
Proof of Lemma 3*: Steps 1 to 4 of the proof of Lemma 3 carry over to show interval
structure. The following observation can be obtained by strengthening step 2 of the proof
of Lemma 3:
Observation 2: For any  > 0, there exists "() > 0 such that if  (m) 6= ? and
( (m)) < "(), then sup  (m)  inf  (m) < 3.
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Proof of Observation 2: Suppose not, so that for any " > 0, 9" 2 (0; ") such that
 (m) 6= ?, ( (m)) < ", and sup  (m)   inf  (m)  3. For such m, there exists
 2  (m) such that j   a (m)j > .
Since ( (m)) < ", for any  where m () = m, 90() 2 [   ";  + "] such that for
some i 2 N , m i (0()) 6= mi. Let i " () be any such i, and consider the following noise :
(i) at states  2  (m)nfg, consider a random variable X s U [0; 1]; if the realization
of X is , sender i " () observes si = , while if not, sender i
 
" () observes si = 
0 for some
0 2 [   ";  + "] where m i (0) 6= mi;
(ii) for all other senders, and for i " () at all other states, the true state is observed.
Clearly,  has size at most ", and a(m) = . By step 1 of the proof of Lemma 3,   is
not robust. 
In the remainder of this proof, adopt the notation from the proof of Lemma 2*.
Case A: b 2 C, a 6= b
Note that (1) still holds. If (2) still holds for " su¢ ciently small, then the argument in
Lemma 2* carries through. For (2) not to hold for " su¢ ciently small, it must be that for
any " > 0, there are innitely many distinct m" for " 2 (0; "). Observation 2 implies that
this can only be the case if there exists a sequence f"kg1k=1 converging to 0 as k ! 1 such
that a (m"k)! b as k !1.
An approximate version of Observation 1(i) that converges to Observation 1(i) as "! 0
can be obtained by making a similar argument and using (1). If at b, i (resp. j) is
indi¤erent between a and some action ai (resp. aj), then by NSI and the niteness of N ,
minj 6=i jai  ajj > 0. A similar argument as in the proof of Observation 1(ii) thus shows that
if NSI holds, then as "! 0, we have a (m"i ;mj;m ij)! a, a (mi;m"j ;m ij)! a, or both.
Now consider a (m"i ;m i). By point 2 in the denition of robustness, if (m
"
i ;m i) were
o¤-path, we could not have ui(a0; b) = ui(a; b) whenever ja0   a (m"i ;m i)j < . This
implies, by (1), that (m"i ;m i) must occur on path for all su¢ ciently small ". Because any
two distinct on-path actions induced by message vectors di¤ering in only one component are
separated by at least  (see the second-to-last paragraph of the proof of Theorem 1a), we have
that for all i and su¢ ciently small ", ui(a (m"i ;m i); b) = ui(a; b). Taking m

 ij = m ij in
the previous paragraph implies that for at least n   1 senders i, we have a (m"i ;m i) = a
for su¢ ciently small ".
(i) If a (m"i ;m i) = a for su¢ ciently small " for all i, then as " ! 0, we must have
a (m"i ;m
"
j ;m i)! a for all pairs (i; j). To see this, note that, at b, i (resp. j) must be nearly
indi¤erent between a (m"i ;m
"
j ;m i) and a
 (mi;m
"
j ;m i) = a (resp. a
 (m"i ;mj;m i) = a),
which, by NSI and the niteness of N , can occur only if a (m"i ;m
"
j ;m i) is near a. Iterating
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this reasoning (which also applies when a (m"i ;m i)! a as "! 0) yields a (m")! a 6= b,
which contradicts the existence of f"kg1k=1 noted earlier.
(ii) If instead there exist arbitrarily small " such that a (m"1;m 1) 6= a, the above iterative




 1); b)  u1(a (m"); b)! 0 as "! 0, for small ", a (m") must be near either
a or a0 6= a, where u1(a0; b) = u1(a; b). The existence of f"kg1k=1, combined with a 6= b,
implies that we must have a0 = b. Since u1(a (m"1;m 1); b) = u1(a; b) for su¢ ciently small
", and there exist arbitrarily small " such that a (m"1;m 1) 6= a, there also exist arbitrarily
small " such that a (m"1;m 1) = a
0 = b. Because, for su¢ ciently small ", (m"1;m 1) occurs
on path, if a (m"1;m 1) = b 6= a, (m"1;m 1) must occur both to the left and to the right of
b. This is not possible: because u1(a (m"1;m 1); b) = u1(a; b), in one of the two cases, by
single-crossing, sender 1 strictly prefers inducing a (m1;m 1) = a to a (m"1;m 1) 6= a.
Case B: b =2 C
Adopt the notation of case B of the proof of Lemma 2*. Like in case A of this proof, if
(4) holds for su¢ ciently small ", then we are done. Once again, by Observation 2, if there is
no " su¢ ciently small such that (4) holds, there must exist a sequence f"kg1k=1 converging to
0 as k ! 1 such that a (m"k) ! b as k ! 1. Here, since m" are sent inside C for small
", we have a (m") = a for small ". Thus, a = b.
Proceeding like in case A (with m (b) and a (m (b)) taking the place of m and a, re-
spectively), in subcase (i), we have a (m")! a (m (b)). Here, this implies a = a (m (b)),
which contradicts b =2 C.
In subcase (ii), we have that a must be equal to either a (m (b)) or a0 6= a (m (b)),
where u1(a0; b) = u1(a (m (b)); b). Since a 6= a (m (b)) (because b =2 C), we have
a0 = a = b. The remainder of the argument is analogous to case A.
Case C: b 2 C, a = b
Because C is proper with right endpoint b, the receivers optimality implies that there
exists another proper supercell C 0 with left endpoint 0b > b where the induced action is also
b. Moreover, 
0
b cannot be right-natural: otherwise, some message vector inducing action b
would be sent only to the right of 0b, which cannot be the case.
If 0b 2 C 0, then the situation is symmetric to case A (now the endpoint 0b and induced
action b cannot be equal), so we are done. Moreover, we cannot have 
0
b =2 C 0: by the rst
paragraph of case B, this is possible only if 0b is the action induced in C
0, which is not the
case here. 
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Online Appendix C: Near Robustness
This section introduces weaker robustness concepts, near robustness and strong near robust-
ness, that require a "nearby" strategy prole, rather than the exact original strategy prole,
to be approximately optimal under noise. As stated in the main paper, Theorems 1 and 2
remain true provided that heterogeneous priors about the noise are allowed.
The closeness of strategy proles is dened as follows.
Denition: Given a prole  , messages mi and m0i are ( ; )-close if for any m i 2
j 6=iM j , ja (mi;m i)  a (m0i;m i)j < .






2. for any proper cell C in   or  0, m 
0
i (si) and m
 
i (si) are ( ; )-close for all si 2 [inf C+
; supC   ];
3. letting a and a0 be the receivers best responses given noise  to the sendersstrategies
in   and  0 respectively, 9" > 0 such that, for all m 2 ni=1M i , ja(m)  a0(m)j < 
whenever the size of  is less than ", and a(m) and a0(m) exist; and
4. ja (m)  a 0(m)j <  for all m 2 ni=1M i .
Points 1 and 4 in the denition of -closeness simply require that the senders use the
same messages in  0 as in  , and that the receiver takes a nearby action after every message
vector. Point 2 restricts the sendersstrategies by requiring the use of the similar messages
in   and  0 in proper cells at least  away from boundaries.4 However, this condition has
no power when dealing with sender strategies that do not feature intervals: it is di¢ cult
to directly determine whether two sender proles with complicated structures are "close."5
Point 3 addresses this issue by using the receivers best response to evaluate how close sender
proles are to each other. Noise is used because, in some cases, two sender proles could
generate the same receiver actions without noise while generating far apart actions with
small noise; such proles ought to be considered distant.
4The requirement can be weakened to allow a small probability of deviation and/or deviation on a small
set of states.
5For example, suppose that within some interval, strategy m i assigns mi within the set of irrational
numbers and m0i elsewhere. Strategy m
 0
i is identical to m
 
i everywhere except on the said interval, where
it assigns mi within the set of transcendental numbers and m0i elsewhere. It is unclear by simple inspection
how "close" m i and m
 0
i should be considered.
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For instance, consider Example 2, and shift all cell boundaries and receiver actions by
less than . The resulting prole is -close to the original one: points 1, 2 and 4 are clearly
satised, and point 3 is as well because as " ! 0, we must have a(m) ! a (m) and
a0(m)! a 0(m).
The denitions for strong near robustness and near robustness parallel the ones for strong
robustness and robustness.
Denition: An equilibrium   in the noiseless game is strongly near-robust if, for every
 > 0, there exists " > 0 such that whenever there is common knowledge that noise has
size less than ", there exists a -close strategy prole  0 where each players strategy r 
0
i is a
-best response to r 
0
 i evaluated under sender is belief about the noise.
Denition: An equilibrium   in the noiseless game is near-robust if:
1. for every  > 0, there exists " > 0 such that whenever there is common knowledge
that noise has local size less than ", there exists a -close strategy prole  0 where each
players strategy r 
0
i is an on-path -best response to r
 0
 i evaluated under sender is
belief about the noise, and
2. in the noiseless game, there exists  > 0 such that whenever the perturbation on the
receivers o¤-path beliefs has size less than , every senders strategy m i is a best
response to m  i and a
 , where a  denotes the receivers best-response to m  and her
perturbed o¤-path beliefs.6
A prole with the characteristics of  0 will be called a -supporting prole.  0 is interim
-optimal, where each players payo¤s are evaluated under her own beliefs.
With these denitions, Theorems 1 and 2 hold with no change. The proofs of Theorems
1b and 2b still apply: they allow for heterogeneous priors, and   is -close to itself for all
 > 0. The proofs of Lemmata 1 to 3, which imply Theorems 1a and 2a, are modied as
follows.
Modied proof of Lemma 1: Suppose   is strongly near-robust. Given   and  0, let
a and a0 denote the receivers best response to fm j gnj=1 and fm 0j gnj=1, respectively, given
noise .
6Point 2 is the same as in the denition of robustness.
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Step 1: For any  > 0, 9" > 0 such that for all noise  with size less than ", ja (m) 
a(m)j <  for all m 2 ni=1M i .
By the denitions of strong near robustness and -closeness, we know that for any  > 0,
9" > 0 such that for all noise  with size less than ", 9 0 such that:
 a 0 is a -best response to fm 0j gnj=1 under ;
 ja (m)  a 0(m)j <  for all m 2 ni=1M i ; and
 ja(m)  a0(m)j <  for all m 2 ni=1M i .
Because uR is continuous and strictly concave in a, and  is compact, the rst point im-
plies that 9() such that, for all m 2 ni=1M i , ja 0(m) a0(m)j < (), with lim!0 () =
0. Therefore, ja (m)  a(m)j < 2 + () for all m 2M i and  with size less than ".
Rewriting  in lieu of 2 + () yields the result. 
The remainder of the proof (steps 2 to 4) is unchanged. 
Lemma 2 is now proved in two steps, numbered 5 and 6 (numbering continued from the
proof of Lemma 1). Suppose a boundary b in   is not left-natural, such as the boundary
between the rst two cells in Example 2, and consider the following beliefs about noise:
each sender believes that she observes the true state while all other senders observe si =
maxf   "; 0g, the receiver believes that all senders observe si = , and these beliefs are
common knowledge. Let m be the message vector sent to the left of the boundary - (1; 1) in
our example. The proof applies the denition of -closeness to show that in a -supporting
prole  0, for  small enough, m must be sent in a neighborhood to the left of b  . Then,
for " small enough, m must also be sent between b    and b    + ": upon observing a
signal in that range, each sender believes opponents will sendm i, and in turn must sendmi,
which gives i expected payo¤ at least  higher than any other message, for  small enough.
Because b is not left-natural, this argument can be iterated past b+, which means that no
-supporting prole can exist. Therefore,   must be natural. This intuition bears parallels
to the global games contagion argument (except for the heterogeneous prior).
Like for steps 2 to 4, the noise distribution used for steps 5 and 6 does not have to be
atomic. For example, the argument carries through if each sender instead believes that other
senderssignals are distributed according to U [maxf "; 0g; ].7 Unlike for steps 2 to 4, the
argument uses noise where the prior is heterogeneous.
7Point 2 of the denition of closeness can also be relaxed: if a message vector close to m must be sent in
 0 with probability near 1 in some interval Im to the left of b   , then the unraveling reasoning remains
valid for su¢ ciently small " (in particular, " < jImj).
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Modied proof of Lemma 2: We proceed by contradiction. Suppose instead, with-
out loss of generality, that the right endpoint b 6= 1 of a proper cell C in   where
m = (m1; :::;mn) is sent is not left-natural. Denote the measure of this proper cell by
.
Step 5: 9 > 0 such that for all i 2 N and m0i 2 M i nfmig, ui(a0; ) +  < ui(a; )
for all  2 [b   ; b + ], a0 2 [a (m0i;m i)   ; a (m0i;m i) + ], and a 2 [a (mi;m i)  
; a (mi;m i) + ].
By the denition of "left-natural," for any i and any m0i 2M i nfmig, either:
(i) ui(a (m0i;m i); b) < ui(a
 (mi;m i); b),
(ii) (m0i;m i) is sent on path in   and a
 (mi;m i) = a (m0i;m i), or
(iii) (m0i;m i) is not sent at any state in   and ui(a
 (m0i;m i); b) = ui(a
 (mi;m i); b).
Because ui is continuous, if (i) holds, then ui(a0; ) < ui(a; ) for all  in a non-degenerate
interval around b, and all a0 and a su¢ ciently near a (m0i;m i) and a
 (mi;m i) respectively.
Therefore, it su¢ ces to show that for any m i, there are nitely many a (m0i;m i) occurring
on the equilibrium path. This must be true since any two such actions must be separated
by at least  (see the second-to-last paragraph of the proof of Theorem 1a).
Case (ii) cannot arise by Assumption A.
Case (iii) cannot arise by step 2. 
Step 6: Let  < minf; 
2
; g. Then, for any " 2 (0;    2), there is no -supporting
prole for   under the following beliefs about the noise:
- Each sender believes that they observe the true state and that other senders observe
maxf   "; 0g.
- The receiver believes that all senders observe the true state. (For the sake of complete-
ness - this will not matter.)
- These beliefs are common knowledge.
By the denition of -closeness, in any -supporting prole  0, it must be that for suf-
ciently small ", for all i, and for all si 2 [b      "; b   ), m 0i (si) is ( ; )-close to mi.
Now suppose m 
0







 i) occur on path in  , so by the same reasoning
used at the end of case (i) of step 5, we must have ja (m 0i (si);m0 i)   a (mi;m0 i)j > .
This contradicts m 
0
i (si) being ( ; )-close to mi since  < . Thus m
 0
i (si) = mi for all
si 2 [b      "; b   ).
Now suppose sender j observes sj 2 [b   ; b    + "). She believes that all senders
i 6= j observed si 2 [b      "; b   ), and therefore will send mi. By step 5, her unique
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-best response is mj. Since this holds for all senders, we have that for all i and for all
si 2 [b   ; b    + "), m 0i (si) = mi.
Iterating the above argument, it follows by step 5 that for all i and for all si 2 [b ; b+],
m 
0
i (si) = mi. By denition,  
0 can be -close to   only if, for all i, m i (si) = mi for all
si 2 [b; b +    ], which contradicts b being the right endpoint of C. Therefore,  0 is not
a -supporting prole of  . 
Under the beliefs about noise in step 6, there is common knowledge that noise is less
than ". We therefore conclude that   is, in fact, not strongly near-robust. 
Modied proof of Lemma 3: Modify step 1 as in the proof of Lemma 1. Steps 2 to
4 are unchanged. Step 5 and 6 follow the modied proof of Lemma 2, as adjusted below.
Step 5: Same statement as step 5 in the proof of Lemma 2, and same argument in cases
(i) and (ii).
Case (iii) is ruled out by point 2 in the denition of near robustness and the continuity
of ui. 
Step 6: Same statement as step 6 in the proof of Lemma 2, except that  is chosen to be
also less than  from the point 2 in the denition of near robustness. Then, to show that, for
small enough ", m 
0
i (si) = mi for all si 2 [b    "; b  ), proceed again by contradiction.






 i) occur on path
but induce di¤erent actions in  . If not, then (m 
0
i (si);m i) is o¤ path in  , and point 2 in
the denition of near robustness implies ja (m 0i (si);m i)   a (mi;m i)j  . This again
contradicts m 
0
i (si) being ( ; )-close to mi since  < .
The remainder of the proof is identical to the analogous part of the modied proof of
Lemma 2. 
17
